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 OPINION OF THE COURT 
 __________________________ 
 
 
BECKER, Circuit Judge.  
 I.  INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
 The Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control 
Act, 21 U.S.C. § 881 et. seq., provides, among other things, for 
civil forfeiture of illegal drug related property.  Section 881 
authorizes the government to seize illegal drugs, containers of 
illegal drugs, records associated with illegal drugs, and other 
  
property associated with or purchased with proceeds derived from 
the distribution of illegal drugs.  Section 881 has become 
attractive to prosecutors because it permits them to seize 
property involved in drug trafficking merely upon a showing of 
probable cause that the property was used to help facilitate a 
drug transaction. 
 Three subsections of § 881 have emerged as far-reaching 
tools of the civil forfeiture scheme.  Section 881(a)(4) provides 
for forfeiture of "conveyances" (airplanes, automobiles, boats, 
etc.) used or intended to be used to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or concealment of a 
controlled substance.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).  Section 881(a)(6) 
provides for forfeiture of "all proceeds traceable" to a drug 
transaction.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(6).  And § 881(a)(7) provides 
for forfeiture of "all real property" which is used or intended 
to be used to facilitate an illegal exchange of a controlled 
substance.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(7). 
 Congress' decision to add §§ 881(a)(4), (6), and (7) to 
the forfeiture scheme signalled a dramatic expansion of the 
government's forfeiture power.  Previously, forfeiture had been 
limited to the illegal substances themselves and the instruments 
by which they were manufactured and distributed.  But §§ 
881(a)(4), (6) and (7) gave the government the power to seize 
property that by all appearances was legitimate.  This 
development gave rise to the possibility that owners who had 
innocently leased or loaned property to others could lose that 
property in a forfeiture proceeding.  For example, a landlord 
  
might forfeit an apartment complex if a tenant was caught dealing 
drugs from an apartment, or a father who had loaned his son the 
family car might lose it if the son were caught transporting 
drugs therein. 
 To ameliorate this problem, Congress engrafted an 
"innocent owner" defense to forfeiture under §§ 881(a)(4), (6), 
and (7).  The "innocent owner" defenses under §§ (a)(6) and (7) 
are the same:  no owner's interest in property may be forfeited 
"by reason of any act or omission established by that owner to 
have been committed or omitted without the knowledge or consent 
of that owner."  21 U.S.C. §§ 881(a)(6), (7).  Congress later 
added the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(4), and it has a 
slightly different formulation:  no owner's interest in a 
"conveyance" shall be forfeited "by reason of any act or omission 
established by that owner to have been committed or omitted 
without the knowledge, consent, or willful blindness of the 
owner."  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C) (emphasis supplied). 
 The overarching issue in this appeal is the extent to 
which the "willful blindness" language found in § 881(a)(4)(C) 
requires us to interpret that innocent owner defense differently 
from the otherwise identical defenses in §§ 881(a)(6) and (7).  
Specifically, we must first determine what constitutes "willful 
blindness" as that term is used in § 881(a)(4)(C).  We must then 
decide whether an owner can claim innocent owner status under 
(a)(4)(E) by showing that he or she lacked either knowledge or 
consent or willful blindness, which, in turn, requires us to 
determine the extent to which the rule in this Circuit that an 
  
owner need only show either lack of knowledge or lack of consent 
to make out the innocent owner defense in the context of § 
881(a)(7), see United States v. Parcel of Real Property Known As 
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 623-626 (3d Cir. 1989), controls 
our interpretation of the defense in the context of § 
881(a)(4)(C). 
 This case arises out of the seizure of a Rolls Royce 
automobile owned by Oscar B. Goodman, a prominent criminal 
defense lawyer who represents clients throughout the country.  
Nicodemo Scarfo, Sr. a former client of Goodman's (and at one 
time the reputed head of the Philadelphia branch of La Cosa 
Nostra ("LCN")), gave Goodman the Rolls Royce in repayment for 
$16,000 that Goodman had paid to the Four Seasons Hotel in 
Philadelphia to cover the cost of a lavish party given by 
Scarfo's son and his friends at the hotel to celebrate Scarfo's 
acquittal at a murder trial in which Goodman was one of the 
defense counsel. 
 In 1989, the FBI seized the vehicle pursuant to § 
881(a)(4).  The agency contended that members of the Scarfo 
family had used the Rolls Royce to shuttle people to and from 
meetings conducted as part of the Scarfo LCN family's drug 
distribution activities.  Goodman filed a verified claim 
asserting innocent ownership pursuant to § 881(a)(4)(C).  Goodman 
alleged that he did not know about, did not consent to, and was 
not willfully blind to the car's use in drug transactions.  After 
a bench trial the district court rejected Goodman's innocent 
  
owner claim and held that the Rolls Royce was subject to 
forfeiture. 
 On appeal, Goodman raises two principal challenges to 
the district court's decision.  First, he contends that the 
district court incorrectly held that he had failed to prove that 
he lacked willful blindness.  Goodman submits that, by holding 
that Goodman was willfully blind because he failed to exercise 
due care to ascertain whether the car had been used to facilitate 
a drug transaction, the district court improperly read willful 
blindness as a negligence provision.  The proper standard, 
Goodman argues, is not an objective "due care" standard but 
rather requires a subjective inquiry, such as "deliberate 
ignorance" or "conscious avoidance." 
 Second, Goodman claims that the district court 
improperly concluded that his failure to prove lack of willful 
blindness, standing alone, defeated his innocent ownership 
defense.  According to Goodman, he is entitled to innocent 
ownership protection even if he knew or was willfully blind to 
the fact that the Rolls Royce had been used to facilitate a drug 
transaction so long as he shows that he did not consent to its 
use therefor.  He argues that our decision in 6109 Grubb Road, 
886 F.2d at 618, which held that under § 881(a)(7) an innocent 
owner defense would lie if the owner showed either lack of 
knowledge or lack of consent, mandates such a result.  He reasons 
that since the innocent owner provision of § 881(a)(7) is 
virtually identical to that in § 881(a)(4)(C), he was entitled to 
show that, notwithstanding his willful blindness, he was an 
  
innocent owner because he did not consent to the Rolls Royce's 
use in the pre-transfer drug transactions.  
 Goodman's first challenge to the district court's 
decision requires us to articulate the meaning of willful 
blindness under § 881(a)(4)(C).  Although it is not clear from 
its opinion, it appears that the district court may have defined 
willful blindness in terms of an objective "due care" standard, 
i.e., the owner's failure to exercise due care to discover 
whether the car was tainted.  To the extent that the district 
court applied an objective standard in determining whether 
Goodman was willfully blind, it erred, for we believe that the 
appropriate standard for willful blindness is the traditional 
subjective standard articulated in United States v. Caminos, 770 
F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985).  Under that standard, a person is 
willfully blind for purposes of § 881(a)(4)(C) when he or she is 
aware of a high probability that the conveyance was used to 
facilitate a drug transaction but fails to take reasonable 
affirmative measures to find out whether the conveyance was in 
fact so used.  Thus, for Goodman to escape the willful blindness 
prong of § 881(a)(4)(C), he needs to show either 1) that 
subjectively he did not recognize the high probability that the 
vehicle was connected to a drug transaction, or 2) that he took 
reasonable steps under the circumstances to learn whether the 
vehicle had actually been used to facilitate a drug transaction.  
Because we cannot be sure that the district court applied this 
standard, we will vacate the judgment of forfeiture and remand 
for reconsideration. 
  
 Goodman's second challenge, relating to consent, raises 
a number of thorny issues.  Our conclusion, however, is 
straightforward.  We conclude that the rationale of 6109 Grubb 
Road applies perforce to forfeitures under § 881(a)(4)(C), and 
that Goodman will be an innocent owner notwithstanding any 
knowledge or willful blindness he may have had if he did not 
consent to the use of the Rolls Royce in connection with drug 
transactions.  Thus, assuming that Goodman can convince the 
factfinder that he did not own the Rolls Royce at the time it was 
used to facilitate a drug transaction, and was not otherwise in a 
position to prevent such a use of the car,  he will have shown 
that he did not consent to its use to facilitate drug 
transactions and hence will be entitled to innocent owner status.  
 While our conclusion on this point is simple to state, 
it has far-reaching implications which raise a number of 
troubling issues about 6109 Grubb Road and the wording of the 
innocent owner defense in the forfeiture statutes.  The 6109 
Grubb Road approach essentially precludes forfeiture of property 
that is owned by persons who: 1) obtained an interest in the 
property after the illegal use; and 2) lacked knowledge about its 
illegal use at the time the illegal use occurred.  Under 6109 
Grubb Road, a post-illegal-act transferee who did not know about 
the act that created the taint at the time it occurred will be an 
innocent owner even if he or she knew about the taint at the time 
he or she received the property.   
 Given this result, the government asks that we decline 
to extend 6109 Grubb Road to forfeitures under § 881(a)(4)(C).  
  
But the government can point to no principled basis for 
distinguishing § 881(a)(4) from § 881(a)(7) for purposes of 
applying 6109 Grubb Road.  Had Scarfo satisfied his debt to 
Goodman by giving him a house instead of a car, the nature of the 
problem would be the same, notwithstanding that the government 
would need to seek forfeiture pursuant to subsection § 881(a)(7) 
instead of § 881(a)(4)(C).  Our comparison of the structure and 
language of §§ 881(a)(4) and (7) and analysis of 6109 Grubb Road 
lead us to conclude that the 6109 Grubb Road construction of the 
statute applies by analogy to § 881(a)(4)(C). 
     While 6109 Grubb Road (which is binding on us 
absent in banc reconsideration under this court's internal 
operating procedures) has its detractors, see United States v. 
Parcel of Real Property Known as 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659 
(3d Cir. 1989) (sur petition for rehearing) (Greenberg, J., 
dissenting), its disjunctive approach ameliorates some of the 
harsh, and quite unfair, results that would occur under the 
alternative to its construction, i.e., a "conjunctive" 
construction requiring the owner show both a lack of knowledge 
and a lack of consent.  Specifically, 6109 Grubb Road allows an 
owner to keep his or her property when he or she has not 
consented to the illegal use by taking all reasonable affirmative 
steps to prevent it.  To discard the 6109 Grubb Road disjunctive 
construction in favor of a conjunctive one might prevent the 
problem we confront now, but it would create another one.  A 
conjunctive construction would deprive innocent owner status to 
owners who know their property is being improperly used but are 
  
unable to put a stop to it despite having taken all reasonable 
steps to do so -- a result which could raise due process 
concerns.  See Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 
U.S. 663, 688-90, 94 S. Ct. 2080, 2094-95 (1974). 
 Although there is no discussion in 6109 Grubb Road of 
the problem that the disjunctive construction creates when the 
statute is applied to post-illegal-act transferees, its absence 
is not surprising.  At the time 6109 Grubb Road was decided, it 
was presumed that a post-illegal-act transferee could never raise 
the innocent owner defense because the relation back provision of 
the civil forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(h), vested title in 
the United States at the time of the illegal act, and thus a 
post-illegal-act transferee could never be an owner.  That 
background presumption changed, however, when the Supreme Court 
held in United States v. Parcel of Land, Buildings, Appurtenances 
& Improvements at 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct. 
1126 (1993), that § 881(h) did not deprive post-illegal-act 
transferees an opportunity to raise the innocent owner defense.  
In a sense, then, 92 Buena Vista Avenue, and not 6109 Grubb Road, 
creates the problem we face today.     
 We believe that, in the wake of 92 Buena Vista Avenue, 
a real ambiguity exists in the statutory language as read by 6109 
Grubb Road.  Because the civil forfeiture statute is punitive in 
nature, we rely on the rule of lenity to resolve the ambiguity in 
favor of the claimant.  We understand that a countervailing maxim 
requires us to construe the statute to avoid an absurd result.  
But we do not think the result we reach is absurd.  As we discuss 
  
in more detail in the main body of the opinion, language in 92 
Buena Vista Avenue raises considerable doubt as to whether the 
forfeiture statutes are meant to reach post-illegal-act 
transferees who did not know about the act causing the taint 
until after it transpired.   
  As a matter of policy choice, it may be that the 
forfeiture laws should apply differently depending on whether a 
claimant obtained the property before or after the events that 
created the taint, but the statute, as currently drafted, fails 
to account for the differences between the two classes of 
claimants.  The remedy for this problem, however, should not be a 
schizophrenic reading of the statutory text, for policy choices 
are not for us to make.  Rather, the remedy should be 
Congressional action.  Until then we will apply 6109 Grubb Road, 
which, as we apply it today, makes the reasonable choice of 
protecting post-illegal-act owners from the oppressive  
application of the forfeiture laws. 
    
 II. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 A. The Rolls Royce, and Goodman's Knowledge of Its Use  
 In January 1976, Scarfo purchased the 1973 Rolls Royce 
from Cream Puff Motors in Palm Beach, Florida.  The purchase 
price was $25,000, most of which was paid in cash, although part 
was paid with a trade-in of a Lincoln Continental.  Scarfo had 
the car registered in Florida to Anthony Gregorio, an associate 
of Scarfo who lived in Fort Lauderdale. 
  
 Shortly after Scarfo bought the vehicle, it was used on 
two occasions to facilitate drug trafficking.  On the first 
occasion, in early 1986, Gregorio drove Scarfo, Phillip Leonetti 
(the "underboss" of the Scarfo LCN family), and some others from 
Scarfo's vacation home to a nightclub in Fort Lauderdale to meet 
with John DiSalvo, a drug dealer from Philadelphia involved in 
trafficking phenyl-2-propanane, a raw material used to 
manufacture methamphetamine.  At that meeting, DiSalvo promised 
to pay Scarfo $200,000 in "street taxes" so that he could operate 
his drug business without interference from the Scarfo LCN 
family.  On the second occasion, in August 1986, Scarfo called a 
meeting of his LCN family members at either his or Gregorio's 
home in Fort Lauderdale.  Francis Ianarella, a "capo" in the 
Scarfo LCN family, came to the meeting.  He flew in from 
Philadelphia and Gregorio picked him up at the airport in the 
Rolls Royce and drove him to a hotel.  Not only was Ianarella in 
Florida to attend the meeting, but he was also bringing $50,000 
in "street taxes" from drug traffickers in the Philadelphia area.  
The $50,000 was ultimately given to Scarfo. 
 By 1987, the FBI had developed enough evidence against 
the Scarfo LCN organization to crack down on its activities.  In 
early 1987, the government initiated a series of prosecutions 
relating to the Scarfo LCN family.  Goodman was involved as 
counsel in a number of them.  In the first trial, Goodman 
represented former Philadelphia City Councilman Leland Beloff, 
who was accused, along with Scarfo, of engaging in a scheme to 
commit extortion upon a real estate developer.  See United States 
  
v. Scarfo, 850 F.2d 1015 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 910 
(1988).  During that trial, Goodman cross-examined Thomas 
DelGiorno -- one of the government's key cooperating witnesses -- 
and during that cross-examination, Goodman forced DelGiorno to 
admit that the Scarfo LCN family engaged in drug trafficking.  
The government contends that this cross-examination put Goodman 
on notice that the Scarfo LCN family was engaged in that 
activity.  
 Following the extortion trial, the government attacked 
Scarfo's organization directly, and in 1987 indicted members of 
the organization, including Scarfo, on federal drug charges.  
Goodman represented Leonetti in the ensuing trial.  During the 
trial, DelGiorno and Nicholas Caramandi testified for the 
government.  DelGiorno testified at length about the Scarfo 
organization's involvement in drugs.  Caramandi stated that, 
although the Scarfo LCN family had a rule against trafficking in 
drugs, the rule was routinely broken, and that Scarfo ordered his 
family members to get money from drug dealers any way they could.  
A jury acquitted Scarfo, Leonetti, and a few others of the 
charges. 
 In May 1988, the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania began its 
own prosecution of Scarfo.  It ultimately tried Scarfo and 
Leonetti for the murder of Salvatore Testa.  Testa, who had been 
the boss of the Philadelphia LCN (Scarfo was his "consigliere" at 
the time), had died when a bomb exploded in his house in early 
1981.  Goodman and his fellow defense attorneys won an acquittal 
for both Scarfo and Leonetti. 
  
 After the jury's unexpected verdict in the Testa murder 
case, the defendants' attorneys, friends, and family met at the 
Four Seasons Hotel in Philadelphia.  A wild celebration ensued.  
According to Goodman, "nothing was spared as far as expense."  
For several hours "Cognac that . . . was $800 a bottle [was] 
imbibed by everyone there," and "$100 bottles of champagne were 
being shaken as if it was a World Series victory and splattered 
all over the wall."  At the end of the evening, however, no one 
in Scarfo's family had the money to pay the $16,000 bill, and 
when Nicodemo Scarfo, Jr. approached Goodman and asked him to 
pay, Goodman agreed.  Shortly after the Four Seasons party, 
Goodman accepted Scarfo Jr.'s offer to repay Goodman with the 
Rolls Royce and $1,500 from each of the three other attorneys 
present at the party. 
 Eventually, the federal government convinced a grand 
jury to indict Scarfo, Leonetti, and others in the Scarfo LCN 
family for RICO violations.  In September 1988, a two-month RICO 
trial began.  Goodman again represented Leonetti.  This time, the 
jury convicted Scarfo, Leonetti, and others of RICO violations 
and underlying drug offenses.  During this trial, on October 5, 
1988, Gregorio endorsed the title to the Rolls Royce to Goodman.  
The transfer was never recorded on state motor vehicle records.  
Although it is not clear whether Gregorio delivered the title to 
him, Goodman did exercise some control over the car, for on March 
1, 1989 he paid $4,000 to remove counter-surveillance equipment 
from the vehicle. 
  
 In September 1989, the FBI seized the Rolls Royce.  
Shortly after the seizure, Goodman came forward claiming that the 
car was his.  The government refused to return the car, claiming 
that Goodman was not entitled to the Rolls Royce because it was 
used to facilitate drug trafficking and that Goodman knew or was 
at least willfully blind to that fact when he accepted the car.  
The car is currently impounded in Philadelphia. 
 
 B. The District Court Opinion  
 Following a bench trial held on February 17, 1993, the 
district court held that Goodman was not entitled to keep the 
Rolls Royce.  United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, V.I.N. SRH-
16266, 817 F. Supp. 571 (E.D. Pa. 1993).  After concluding that 
the government had met its burden under § 881(a)(4) to show that 
there was probable cause for forfeiture,1 the court rejected 
Goodman's claim that he was an innocent owner.  Id. at 576.  
According to the court, Goodman had failed to show that he was 
not willfully blind to the use of the Rolls Royce to facilitate 
drug trafficking.  Id. at 576-80.2 
                     
1
.  Most of the government's case was based on the testimony of 
FBI Agent Randal Wolverton.  He recounted statements made by 
Leonetti, DelGiorno, and Caramandi, who are now all cooperating 
witnesses and have on several occasions testified about the 
illegal activities of members of the Scarfo LCN crime family. 
2
.  The government had also argued that it had shown probable 
cause that the Rolls Royce had been purchased with proceeds from 
illegal drug transactions, which might suffice to support 
forfeiture pursuant to § 881(a)(6).  Because the district court 
decided as it did on the § 881(a)(4) question, it did not reach 
the § 881(a)(6) question. 
  
 The court recognized that the innocent owner defense of 
§ 881(a)(4)(C) saves from forfeiture a vehicle used to facilitate 
drug trafficking if the owner can establish that the illegal 
activity was committed without the knowledge, consent, or willful 
blindness of the owner.  Relying on two cases discussing the 
willful blindness standard in § 881(a)(4)(C), United States v. 
One 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d 1172, 1175 (8th Cir. 1992), and 
United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 748 F. Supp. 1180, 
1186 (W.D. Tex. 1990), aff'd on other grounds, 946 F.2d 30 (5th 
Cir. 1991), the district court formulated the following standard 
for willful blindness: 
 Lack of willful blindness sufficient to 
prevail as an innocent owner under § 
881(a)(4)(C) means that a claimant must show 
that he or she has not ignored a signal or 
suggestion that a vehicle might have been 
used to facilitate the trafficking of illegal 
drugs.  Such a suggestion might arise from 
the fact that the vehicle was owned by one 
accused of drug trafficking.  As in this 
case, once the claimant chooses to ignore the 
signal, he or she can no longer establish 
lack of willful blindness to the prior use of 
the vehicle that would subject it to 
forfeiture. 
 
817 F. Supp. at 578. 
 Applying this standard, the district court found that 
Goodman had failed to prove that he was not willfully blind, 
i.e., that knowing what he did about Scarfo, he failed to show 
that he had taken any steps to determine whether the Rolls Royce 
facilitated drug trafficking.  According to the court, Goodman's 
representation of Leonetti in the drug trials and his cross-
  
examination of DelGiorno in the Beloff trial rendered his 
testimony that he did not think the Scarfo LCN family dealt in 
drugs incredible;3 and Goodman's general knowledge of the Scarfo 
LCN family's involvement in drug trafficking was a sufficient 
"signal or suggestion" that the Rolls Royce had been used in 
connection with the trafficking of drugs.  Id. at 580.4  Since 
Goodman did nothing to determine whether the Rolls Royce in fact 
had been used to facilitate drug trafficking, the district court 
reasoned, he failed to show that he had not been willfully blind.  
Id. 
 The court went on to hold that Goodman's failure to 
prove that he lacked willful blindness alone defeated his 
innocent owner claim.  Id.  Goodman had claimed that 
notwithstanding his willful blindness, he could still prevail if 
he could show that he did not consent to the Rolls Royce's use in 
the DiSalvo and Ianarella meetings.  To support this argument, 
Goodman pointed to 6109 Grubb Road, which had held that proof of 
either lack of knowledge or lack of consent was sufficient to 
make out an innocent owner defense under § 881(a)(7).  The court 
                     
3
.  Goodman had testified that as far as he knew, the LCN 
"abhorred" the trafficking of illegal drugs; that "if you accused 
[LCN] members of drugs, the hackles went up"; and that he had 
absolutely no indication the Rolls Royce was ever utilized to 
facilitate illegal drug trafficking.   
4
.  The court rejected Goodman's argument that the relevant 
question was not whether he was willfully blind to Scarfo's or 
Leonetti's involvement in drugs, but whether he was willfully 
blind to the fact that the Rolls Royce itself was used to 
facilitate drug trafficking.  According to the court, such an 
argument would "misconstrue[] the willful blindness standard."  
Id. at 580. 
  
declined to extend 6109 Grubb Road to § 881(a)(4)(C), however, 
reasoning that the 6109 Grubb Road approach would convert the 
willful blindness language of § 881(a)(4)(C) into surplusage.5  
The district court then entered a final judgment of forfeiture. 
 Goodman filed a timely appeal.  Although we may not set 
aside the district court's factual findings unless they are 
clearly erroneous, see Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a), our review of the 
district court's construction of § 881(a)(4)(C) is plenary.  See 
United States v. 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d 73, 76 n.3 (3d Cir. 
1991).  The National Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers has 
filed an amicus brief in support of Goodman's appeal.      
 
  III. DISCUSSION 
 A.  Forfeiture Under § 881(a)(4) 
 Section 881(a)(4) provides that "conveyances," 
including automobiles, used to facilitate drug trafficking are 
subject to forfeiture.  21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4).6  As with all the 
                     
5
.  As the court explained:  "If a claimant were able to prevail 
under § 881(a)(4)(C) . . . by showing either lack of knowledge or 
lack of consent or lack of willful blindness, then the words 
`willful blindness' represent nothing more than a useless third 
bite at the apple."  817 F. Supp. at 581. 
6
.  Section 881(a)(4) provides in pertinent part that the 
following items are subject to forfeiture: 
 
 All conveyances, including aircraft, vehicles, or 
vessels, which are used, or intended for use, to 
transport, or in any manner to facilitate the 
transportation, sale, receipt, possession, or 
concealment of [controlled substances] . . .  
 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4). 
 
  
forfeiture provisions of § 881, § 881(a)(4) places upon the 
government the initial burden to show probable cause for 
forfeiture.  Probable cause exists if facts show reasonable 
grounds to believe that the property was used to facilitate a 
drug transaction.  6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 621.  Once the 
government shows probable cause, the burden shifts to the 
claimant to show that he or she has a defense to the forfeiture.  
The most common defense, and the only one pertinent here, is the 
"innocent owner" defense provided in § 881(a)(4)(C), which states 
that  
 no conveyance shall be forfeited under [§ 
881(a)(4)] to the extent of an interest of an 
owner, by reason of any act or omission 
established by that owner to have been 
committed or omitted without the knowledge, 
consent, or willful blindness of the owner. 
21 U.S.C. § 881(a)(4)(C).7  To make out the defense, the claimant 
must show 1) that he or she is an owner and 2) that he or she did 
not know, or was not willfully blind, or did not consent, to the 
                     
7
.  Enacted as part of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1988, § 
881(a)(4)(C) was in large part a reaction to the excesses of the 
Coast Guard's "zero tolerance" policy.  The "zero tolerance" 
policy had resulted in seizures of enormous commercial vessels 
based on the presence of minuscule personal quantities of drugs.  
For example, in one of the worst abuses of the forfeiture 
statutes, the Coast Guard seized the research vessel Atlantis 
because it had found one marijuana cigarette in the crew's 
quarters.  See Washington Digest (July 25, 1988), at 1-2, 
reprinted in 1 David B. Smith, Prosecution and Defense of 
Forfeiture Cases at ¶ 4.02[4][a] n.10, at 4-10.  This prompted 
Representative Gary Studds of Massachusetts to tell the acting 
Customs Commissioner, William von Raab, during a subcommittee 
hearing, "If you can't find something better to do with your 
limited resources than this kind of lunacy, then maybe we've been 
giving you too much money."  Id. 
  
improper use of the property.  This second component of the 
defense can be somewhat difficult to establish because it forces 
the claimant to prove a negative. 
 There is no serious dispute that the government 
established probable cause that the Rolls Royce had been used to 
facilitate a drug transaction.  FBI Agent Randal Wolverton 
testified that Leonetti told him that the car was used to bring 
Scarfo to the meeting with DiSalvo, and that it was used to bring 
Ianarella, who was carrying the "street taxes," to Scarfo.  
Although Agent Wolverton's testimony was merely hearsay, probable 
cause for forfeiture may be established by hearsay evidence, see 
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d at 621, and it was adequate to show 
probable cause here. 
 As we have mentioned, the main bone of contention is 
whether Goodman showed that he was an "innocent" owner under § 
881(a)(4)(C).8  We first consider whether the district court 
                     
8
.  While the government questions whether Goodman is truly an 
"owner" of the car, the district court's finding that Goodman 
received title to the Rolls Royce on October 5, 1988 is not 
clearly erroneous.  Although the res is located in Pennsylvania, 
Goodman's interest is determined by reference to Florida law, the 
place where his interest arose.  See Restatement (Second) of 
Conflicts § 247 ("Interests in chattel are not affected by the 
mere removal of the chattel to another state.").  Under Florida 
law, the endorsement of title to him sufficed to demonstrate 
ownership.  See Nash Miami Motors, Inc. v. Bandel, 47 So. 2d 701 
(Fla. 1950).  Although a lienholder could have an interest 
superior to Goodman's (because the transfer of title was 
unrecorded), see In re Canup Mech., Inc., 1 B.R. 703 (Bankr. M.D. 
Fla. 1979), the only challenge to Goodman's claim of ownership 
comes from the United States, which has no property interest if 
Goodman can sustain the innocent owner defense.  See United 
States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances & Improvements at 
92 Buena Vista Ave., Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct. 1126, 1137 (1993). 
  
(..continued) 
 The government has made two related arguments 
challenging this conclusion which we shall briefly address.  
First, the government submits that the appropriate law is not 
state law but federal common law, and as a matter of federal 
common law an unregistered title certificate does not create an 
ownership interest.  Second, it contends that Goodman must be 
able to show that the Rolls Royce was a "true gift."  The case 
law has generally rejected the first argument:  state law defines 
ownership interests.  See United States v. 1977 Porsche Carrera 
911, 946 F.2d 30, 34 (5th Cir. 1991); United States v. Lot 9, 
Block 2 of Donnybrook Place, 919 F.2d 994, 1000 (5th Cir. 1990); 
United States v. Certain Real Property Located at 2525 LeRoy 
Lane, 910 F.2d 343, 347 (6th Cir. 1990) ("We see no language in 
the civil forfeiture provisions which would mandate the 
application of a federal common law of property.  We conclude 
that recognition of state laws governing property rights does not 
contravene the federal forfeiture scheme, and that the 
application of state law is the most appropriate method of 
determining the interest of an owner under 21 U.S.C. § 
881(a)(7)."), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 947, 111 S. Ct. 1414 (1991); 
see also 1500 Lincoln Ave., 949 F.2d at 75 (looking to 
Pennsylvania law to define owner's interest); United States v. 
One Single Family Residence Located at 15621 S.W. 209th Ave., 
Miami, Fla., 894 F.2d 1511, 1514 (11th Cir. 1990) (looking to 
Florida law to determine interest affected by forfeiture law).  
We agree with this case law. 
 The second argument, however, does give us pause.  
Although it is not entirely clear what the government means by 
"true gift," we believe it is contending that Goodman cannot 
claim innocent ownership of the property unless the transfer was 
bona fide in the sense that it was not by design simply a 
transaction to shield Scarfo's assets from forfeiture.  This 
appears to be a variant of a proposition we have accepted in a 
similar context -- that nominal or straw owners lack standing to 
challenge a forfeiture proceeding.  See United States v. Contents 
of Accounts Nos. 3034504504 & etc., 971 F.2d 974, 985-86 (3d Cir. 
1992) (stating that in the context of the civil forfeiture 
provisions of title 18, 18 U.S.C. § 981, a corporation that had 
legal title to property but which was merely an alter ego and a 
straw owner, lacked standing to challenge the forfeiture), cert. 
denied, 113 S. Ct. 1580 (1993).  Accounts No. 3034504504 
interpreted standing for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 981, but relied 
exclusively on cases interpreting the standing requirements under 
the forfeiture statute involved in this case, and is in accord 
with the holdings of those cases.  See United States v. Premises 
Known as 526 Liscum Drive, 866 F.2d 213, 217 (6th Cir. 1989) 
(stating that "possession of bare legal title by one who does not 
exercise dominion or control over property may be insufficient to 
establish standing to challenge a forfeiture"); United States v. 
  
properly concluded that Goodman failed to show that he was not 
(..continued) 
One 1945 Douglas C-54 (DC-4) Aircraft, etc., 604 F.2d 27, 28-29 
(8th Cir. 1979) (holding that owners of the res have standing to 
challenge a forfeiture proceeding, but that bare legal title may 
be insufficient to establish ownership), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 
1143, 102 S. Ct. 1002 (1982). 
 This case law is in considerable tension with the 
precept we have endorsed above that "ownership" is determined by 
reference to state law.  Although characterized as a rule of 
standing, the "nominal ownership" rule is in fact a back-door 
method of defining the ownership interest required to claim 
innocent owner status.  As a result, the nominal ownership rule 
seems to apply a federal common law gloss to the proposition that 
state law controls the question of ownership.  But it is not 
clear to us why there is any need for such a federal common law 
gloss since state law appears to makes adequate provision for 
depriving "nominal" or "straw" owners of full "ownership."  State 
fraudulent transaction law, alter-ego, or veil piercing 
doctrines, for example, allow creditors to look past legal 
fictions and interests to reach the property of the "true" owner.  
See, e.g., West's F.S.A. § 726.105(1)(a) (under fraudulent 
conveyance law, "a transfer made or obligation incurred by a 
debtor is fraudulent as to a creditor, whether the creditor's 
claim arose before or after the transfer was made or the 
obligation incurred, if the debtor made the transfer or incurred 
the obligation: (a) with actual intent to hinder, delay, or 
defraud any creditor of the debtor"). 
 We believe that the standing inquiry suggests that the 
question of determining ownership may in fact ultimately be 
governed by federal common law.  Nevertheless, it is well 
established that federal common law may incorporate state law as 
the rule of decision.  See United States v. Kimbell Foods, Inc., 
440 U.S. 715, 728-30, 99 S. Ct. 1448, 1458-59 (1979); United 
States v. Little Lake Misere Land Co., 412 U.S. 580, 594, 93 S. 
Ct. 2389, 2398 (1973).  Thus, our reliance on state law to define 
the ownership interest may be most accurately defined as 
incorporation of state law as part of the federal common law.  
And such incorporation, for all practical purposes, is the same 
as total displacement of federal law by state law.  See Boyle v. 
United Technologies Corp., 487 U.S. 500, 507 n.3 (1988) 
(questioning whether there is significance to the distinction 
between the use of state law and the use of federal law which 
incorporates state law).  Since the incorporation of state law 
under these circumstances does not "conflict" with the federal 
common law rule that has developed in the standing context, we 
still believe it to be appropriate to apply state law.            
  
willfully blind to the fact that the Rolls Royce was used to 
facilitate a drug transaction.  We then consider whether Goodman 
should be entitled to show on remand that, notwithstanding his 
willful blindness (if any), he is entitled to innocent owner 
status because he did not consent to the drug related uses of the 
vehicle. 
 
 B.  Willful Blindness and § 881(a)(4)(C) 
  1.  The Standard 
 This court has yet to construe the "willful blindness" 
language in § 881(a)(4)(C).  We must choose between two possible 
standards:  an objective "due care" standard, on the one hand, 
and a subjective "deliberate ignorance" or "conscious avoidance" 
standard on the other.  Under the objective standard, willful 
blindness exists when an owner fails to exercise due care to 
ensure that the property will not be and has not been used to 
facilitate a drug transaction.  Under the subjective standard, 
willful blindness exists if the owner is aware of a high 
probability that the property will be or has been used to 
facilitate a drug transaction and does not make reasonable 
inquiries to confirm whether it will be or in fact has been so 
used. 
 Unfortunately, the statutory language does not define 
willful blindness, and the legislative history reveals 
considerable confusion over the concept.  Representative Shaw, a 
major force behind the enactment of § 881(a)(4)(C), suggested 
that the willful blindness component was meant to impose a duty 
  
on owners to be "reasonably informed concerning the purpose for 
which another person may use their property."  134 Cong. Rec. 
33,290 (1988) (statement of Rep. Shaw).  Thus he apparently 
endorsed the objective "due care" definition of willful 
blindness, a definition he derived from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Calero-Toledo v. Pearson Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 
663, 94 S. Ct. 2080 (1974).  See 134 Cong. Rec. 33, 290 (1988) 
(statement of Rep. Shaw).   
 In Calero-Toledo, the Court stated in dicta that a 
defense to forfeiture might be available to "an owner who proved 
not only that he was uninvolved in and unaware of the wrongful 
activity, but also that he had done all that reasonably could be 
expected to prevent the proscribed use of his property."  416 
U.S. at 689, 94 S. Ct. at 2094-95.  At issue in Calero-Toledo, 
however, was the constitutionality of a Puerto Rican forfeiture 
statute, and thus the Calero-Toledo dicta only addressed a 
possible constitutional limit of a forfeiture statute.  
Ironically, then, Representative Shaw used a potential outer 
constitutional limit on the power of a forfeiture statute for the 
meaning of a provision that was intended to cut back on the reach 
of the statute.  In other words, if the willful blindness prong 
in § 881(a)(4)(C) is interpreted according to the Calero-Toledo 
constitutional text, then the provision is entirely superfluous 
since the Calero-Toledo constitutional limit applies to every 
  
forfeiture statute, even those without an innocent owner 
provision.9 
  Of course Calero-Toledo might still provide the meaning 
of willful blindness in § 881(a)(4)(C) if that is what Congress 
had intended.  But we doubt that other legislators shared 
Representative Shaw's belief that the willful blindness language 
be equated with the Calero-Toledo dicta.  Most others who made 
statements on the matter apparently had in mind the more 
traditional common law formulation of willful blindness -- a 
subjective "deliberate ignorance" or "conscious avoidance" state 
of mind.  See 134 Cong. Rec. 33,288 (1988) ("Willful blindness 
addresses the cases of individuals who have demonstrated a 
conscious purpose to avoid the truth.") (statement of Rep. 
Young); id. at 33,313 ("[The concept of willful blindness] is 
intended to prevent the owner of a conveyance from closing his 
eyes to a violation.") (statement of Rep. Jones); id. at 33,315 
("Willful blindness addresses the case of individuals who have 
demonstrated a conscious purpose to avoid the truth.  The concept 
of willful blindness is essentially part of the proof of 
knowledge.") (statement of Rep. Davis). 
 Perhaps because of the confusion in the legislative 
history, a circuit split appears to be developing over the 
                     
9
.  Representative Shaw's confusion over the relationship between 
the statutory requirement of willful blindness and Calero-Toledo 
is also evident from other parts of his statement about § 
881(a)(4)(C).  For example, he stated that "this section is not 
intended to overturn [Calero-Toledo]."  But, since Calero-Toledo 
discuses the constitutional limitation on forfeiture statutes, 
Congress could not overturn it. 
  
definition of willful blindness in the context of civil 
forfeiture.  The Eleventh Circuit has held that the appropriate 
standard is the objective due care standard of Calero-Toledo.  
United States v. One 1980 Bertram 58' Motor Yacht, 876 F.2d 884, 
888 (11th Cir. 1989).  Bertram endorsed a pure due care standard: 
the owner had to do "everything that a truly innocent owner 
reasonably could be expected to do to insure that his vessel was 
not to be used illegally."  Id. at 889.10  The Eighth Circuit, 
however, has held in 1989 Jeep Wagoneer that the appropriate 
standard is the subjective one -- whether one deliberately closed 
his or her eyes to what otherwise would have been obvious -- and 
has expressly rejected the idea that the willful blindness test 
under § 881(a)(4)(C) should be identical to the constitutional 
standard of Calero-Toledo.  See 976 F.2d at 1174-75. 
 In our leading case on willful blindness, United States 
v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985), we held that the 
deliberate ignorance requirement is met only if "the defendant 
himself was subjectively aware of the high probability of the 
fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable man would have 
been aware of the probability."  Id. at 365.  Under this 
definition, willful blindness is a subjective state of mind that 
                     
10
.  In applying the willful blindness standard to the facts 
before it, the Bertram panel held that once an owner of a yacht 
advertised it for sale in Miami and a purchaser came forward with 
a cash deposit, the owner had a duty to ask for identification 
from the purchaser, call local law enforcement officials, and 
inquire about the purchaser's reputation in the community in 
order to maintain his status as an innocent owner.  Id. at 888-
89.  Because the owner had failed to take such steps, he was held 
not to be an innocent owner.  Id. 
  
is deemed to satisfy a scienter requirement of knowledge.11   
                     
11
.  In Caminos, we adopted the deliberate ignorance charge that 
originated in United States v. Jewell, 532 F.2d 697 (9th Cir.), 
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 951, 96 S. Ct. 3173 (1976).  In Jewell, 
which involved a defendant who was caught with marijuana in a 
compartment of his car, the Ninth Circuit endorsed the following 
instruction: 
 
 The Government can complete [its] burden of proof by 
proving, beyond a reasonable doubt, that if the 
defendant was not actually aware that there was 
marijuana in the vehicle . . . his ignorance in that 
regard was solely and entirely a result of his having 
made a conscious purpose to disregard the nature of 
that which was in the vehicle . . . . 
 
532 F.2d at 700.  In dissent, Judge (now Justice) Kennedy pointed 
out that conscious avoidance alone is not sufficient to create a 
mental state equal in culpability to knowledge.  According to 
Judge Kennedy, the conscious avoidance must be accompanied by an 
awareness of a high probability that a fact exists for it to be 
culpable.  Id. at 707 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).  He also argued 
that willful blindness cannot exist where there was an actual 
belief that the relevant fact did not exist.  According to Judge 
Kennedy, lack of an instruction to that effect created a risk 
that a defendant would be held to an objective reasonable person 
standard, whereas true ignorance, no matter how unreasonable, 
should constitute a defense to criminal liability based on 
knowledge.  Id. 
 It appears that the Caminos instruction was closer to 
Judge Kennedy's formulation than the majority's in Jewell.  In 
Caminos the instruction stated in part: 
  
 [I]f the evidence shows that [the defendant] positively 
did not know, then, of course, he must be acquitted.  
And if the evidence indicates that he was very stupid 
in the action he took, or ignorant, he cannot be 
convicted.  But if the evidence shows that there was a 
high probability that he knew something was amiss and 
that he failed to take steps to investigate, to find 
out whether that was true or not, then you may find 
that he had the guilty knowledge which is required for 
conviction of the offense of importing a controlled 
substance. 
 
770 F.2d at 366.  The one incongruity between this instruction 
and Judge Kennedy's formulation in the Jewell dissent is that the 
Caminos instruction asked whether there was a high probability 
  
Although courts and commentators have yet to come to a consensus 
on definition of willful blindness,12 the Caminos formulation 
(..continued) 
that the defendant knew something was amiss.  Though this might 
have suggested some objective component to the inquiry, the 
Caminos panel read the instruction as requiring a subjective 
awareness of a high probability that something was amiss.  Id. at 
365. 
12
.  Willful blindness has proven to be an elusive concept and 
much disagreement still exists over the appropriate definition of 
the term.  See Jewell, 532 F.2d at 706 (Kennedy, J., dissenting) 
("There is disagreement as to whether reckless disregard for the 
existence of a fact constitutes wilful blindness or some lesser 
degree of culpability. . . . There is also the question of 
whether to use an `objective' test based on the reasonable man, 
or to consider the defendant's subjective belief as dispositive." 
(footnotes omitted)).   
 Some believe willful blindness is simply a surrogate 
for knowledge.  See Rollin M. Perkins, Criminal Law 776 (2d ed. 
1969) ("One with a deliberate antisocial purpose in mind . . . 
may deliberately `shut his eyes' to avoid knowing what would 
otherwise be obvious to view.  In such cases, so far as the 
criminal law is concerned, the person acts at his peril in this 
regard, and is treated as having `knowledge' of the facts as they 
are ultimately discovered to be."); Glanville Williams, Criminal 
Law, The General Part § 57, at 159 (2d ed. 1961) ("To the 
requirement of actual knowledge there is one strictly limited 
exception. . . .  [T]he rule is that if a party has his suspicion 
aroused but then deliberately omits to make further enquiries, 
because he wishes to remain in ignorance, he is deemed to have 
knowledge.  The rule that willful blindness is equivalent to 
knowledge is essential and is found throughout the criminal 
law."); Edwards, The Criminal Degrees of Knowledge, 17 Mod. L. 
Rev. 294, 298 (1954) ("For well nigh a hundred years, it has been 
clear from the authorities that a person who deliberately shuts 
his eyes to an obvious means of knowledge has sufficient mens rea 
for an offense based on such words as . . . `knowingly.'").  
Others equate it with a less culpable state of mind.  See Robin 
Charlow, Wilful Ignorance, 70 Tex. L. Rev. 1351, 1429 (1992) 
("Although wilful ignorance is usually employed to satisfy a 
statutory mens rea of knowledge, the most prevalent definitions 
of the doctrine describe a state of mind that is . . . not as 
culpable as knowledge."); Ira P. Robbins, The Ostrich 
Instruction:  Deliberate Ignorance as a Crim. Mens Rea, 81 Crim. 
L. & Criminology 191, 195 (1990) ("Deliberate ignorance 
constitutes recklessness, rather than knowledge."). 
  
basically adopts the mainstream conception of willful blindness 
as a state of mind of much greater culpability than simple 
negligence or recklessness, and more akin to knowledge.  See 
supra n.12.  See also United States v. Rivera, 944 F.2d 1563, 
1570 (11th Cir. 1991) (willful blindness equated with the concept 
of "deliberate ignorance" and treated a state of mind equally 
culpable as actual knowledge); United States v. Rothrock, 806 
F.2d 318, 323 (1st Cir. 1986) ("The purpose of the willful 
blindness theory is to impose criminal liability on people who, 
recognizing the likelihood of wrongdoing, nonetheless consciously 
refuse to take basic investigatory steps.").  Thus in the absence 
of a clear statement in either the statute or the legislative 
history, we adopt the Caminos definition of willful blindness for 
§ 881(a)(4)(C).13 
                     
13
.  The Caminos "deliberate ignorance" conception is careful to 
distance willful blindness from a due care or negligence 
standard.  Indeed, any willful blindness instruction must be 
designed to reduce the risk that willful blindness will be found 
where there was simply a lack of due care or even where there was 
recklessness.  Accord United States v. Cassiere, 4 F.3d 1006, 
1023 (1st Cir. 1993) ("Caution is necessary in giving a willful 
blindness instruction `because of the possibility that the jury 
will be led to employ a negligence standard and convict a 
defendant [on the ground] that he should have known [an illegal 
act] was taking place.'" (quoting United States v. Littlefield, 
840 F.2d 143, 148 n.3 (1st Cir. 1988))).  
 This threat has led some, including the drafters of the 
Model Penal Code, to conclude that the concept of willful 
blindness should simply be folded into the definition of 
knowledge.  See Model Penal Code § 2.02(7); see also Note, Model 
Penal Code Section 2.02(7) and Willful Blindness, 102 Yale L. J. 
2231 (1993) (arguing that willful blindness should be eliminated 
and replaced with the broader definition of knowledge found in 
the Model Penal Code).  Under the Model Penal Code § 2.02(7), 
when knowledge of a fact is an element of an offense, it is 
established "if a person is aware of a high probability of its 
existence, unless he actually believes that it does not exist."  
  
 This construction is consistent with the general 
agreement manifest in the legislative history that the § 
881(a)(4)(C) innocent owner defense should be the same as those 
of §§ 881(a)(6) and (7).  Representative Shaw, for instance, 
stated that the defense under § 881(a)(4)(C) was "virtually 
identical" to the defense for innocent owners under §§ 881(a)(6) 
and (7).  134 Cong. Rec. 33,290 (1988).  Others expressed the 
same sentiments. See 134 Cong. Rec. 33,288 (1988) ("The concept 
of willful blindness is essentially part of the proof of lack of 
knowledge.  For this reason, the defense for innocent owners of 
conveyances seized for drug related offenses is virtually 
identical to the existing defenses for innocent owners of real 
property . . . or other things of value under paragraphs (6) and 
(7) of section 511(a) of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 
811(a)(6) and (7)).") (statement of Rep. Young); ("[T]he defense 
for innocent owners of conveyances seized for drug-related 
offense[s] is virtually identical to the existing defenses for 
innocent owners of real property, and money . . . .") (statement 
of Rep. Young); see also 1 David Smith, Prosecution and Defense 
of Forfeiture Cases ¶ 4.02[4][a], at 4-10 (1993) ("[Section 
(..continued) 
The Model Penal Code provision "requires an awareness of a high 
probability that a fact exists, not merely a reckless disregard, 
or a suspicion followed by a failure to make further inquiry.  It 
also establishes knowledge as a matter of subjective belief, an 
important safeguard against diluting the guilty state of mind 
required for conviction."  Jewell, 532 F.2d at 707 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting).  This, as noted, is consistent with Cominos.  The 
Supreme Court has explicitly endorsed the Model Penal Code 
formulation for knowledge. See Turner v. United States, 396 U.S. 
398, 416, 90 S. Ct. 642, 652 (1970); Leary v. United States, 395 
U.S. 6, 46 n.93, 89 S. Ct. 1532, 1553 n.93 (1969). 
  
881(a)(4)(C)] should be interpreted in pari materia with the 
identical innocent owner provisions in sections 881(a)(6) and 
(a)(7)."). 
 Our construction is further supported by the fact that, 
despite the textual absence of willful blindness terminology, 
both § 881(a)(6) and § 881(a)(7) have been interpreted by many 
courts to require owners to demonstrate not only a lack of actual 
knowledge, but also a lack of willful blindness.14  Because the 
only way willful blindness can become part of the innocent owner 
defense in those sections is if the "knowledge" component is read 
to incorporate willful blindness, courts have tended to adopt the 
"deliberate ignorance" formulation of willful blindness in §§ 
881(a)(6) and (7).  See, e.g., 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d at 480 
(stating that the claimant could have avoided knowledge that the 
                     
14
.    See United States v. 1980 Red Ferrari, 827 F.2d 477 (9th 
Cir. 1987);  United States v. One Parcel of Property at 755 
Forest Road, 985 F.2d 70, 72 (2d Cir. 1993); United States v. 
$4,255,000, 762 F.2d 895, 906 (11th Cir. 1985) (upholding § 
881(a)(6) forfeiture where the owner "indicated a tacit 
acknowledgement of his disquieting belief that these large cash 
deposits were coming to [a depositor] by way of Colombian 
couriers carrying narcotic-generated cash" and "[the owner] had a 
`gnawing belief that the funds being dealt with were tainted'"), 
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 1056, 106 S. Ct. 795 (1986); 1977 Porsche 
Carrera 911, 748 F. Supp. at 1186 ("The `willful blindness' 
language of subsection (4)(C) is absent from subsection (6), but 
the legislative history behind the differing language may suggest 
that Congress intended that a claimant prove the absence of all 
three circumstances --- knowledge, consent, and willful blindness 
-- to prevail under any of the subsections of section 881 to 
which the innocent owner exception applies.").  But see United 
States v. One Single Family Residence Located at 6960 MiraFlores 
Ave., 995 F.2d 1558, 1564 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding irrelevant 
under § 881(a)(7) whether the owner "deliberately closed his eyes 
to what he had every reason to believe was the truth"). 
  
Ferrari was involved in drug trafficking only by "sticking his 
head in the sand" (internal quotation omitted)).  Thus, 
interpreting § 881(a)(4)(C) to require the owner to show a lack 
of deliberate ignorance ensures that its innocent owner defense 
is the same as that required under §§ 881(a)(6) and (7).15 
 
 2.  Application of the Standard 
 Turning now to the facts before us, under the standard 
we adopt today, willful blindness could not be found if it were 
positively established that Goodman did not know that the Rolls 
Royce was used for drug trafficking.  Similarly, if Goodman were 
just lacking in intelligence, negligent, or mistaken, he should 
not be found to have been willfully blind.  But if Goodman fails 
to show that he did not know there was a high probability that 
the vehicle had been used to traffic drugs, and then fails to 
show that he took affirmative steps to investigate whether the 
car had in fact been used to facilitate drug trafficking, he will 
not have satisfied his burden to show that he was not willfully 
blind. 
                     
15
.  This conclusion is also consistent with the view of a 
leading commentator.  See 1 Smith at ¶ 4.03[c][ii], at 4-90.1-
90.2 ("Deliberate avoidance of knowledge by sticking one's head 
in the sand will be equated with actual knowledge, as in criminal 
cases.  This is so regardless of the fact that sections 881(a)(6) 
and (a)(7) do not contain an explicit `willful blindness' 
exception to the defense for innocent owners, unlike section 
881(a)(4).  However, failure to exercise due care does not 
preclude reliance on the innocent owner defense."); id. at ¶ 
4.03[c][ii], at 4-90.2 n.82 (describing cases that equate willful 
blindness with a lack of due care as "clearly wrong" and stating 
that willful blindness should not be equated with negligence). 
  
 Unfortunately, we cannot determine whether the district 
court used the appropriate standard when it held that Goodman 
failed to show that he was not willfully blind.  The district 
court formulated the willful blindness standard as "ignor[ing] a 
signal or suggestion that a vehicle might have been used to 
facilitate the trafficking of illegal drugs" and explained that 
"once the claimant chooses to ignore the signal, he or she can no 
longer establish lack to willful blindness to the prior use of 
the vehicle . . . ."  Amicus argues that this language is an 
objective "due care" formulation.  The government disagrees.  We 
are inclined to agree with amicus, though we cannot tell for 
sure.  Although the district court supported its conclusion by 
citing 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d at 1175, which endorsed a 
subjective standard, it then cited language from 1977 Porsche 
Carrera 911, 748 F. Supp. at 1186, which seems to endorse an 
objective one.  Moreover, the standard announced by the district 
court focuses on the owner rather than the car (it stated "[s]uch 
a suggestion might arise from the fact that the vehicle was owned 
by one accused of drug trafficking,"), but it does so 
erroneously, see infra at 35.  We therefore will vacate the 
judgment of forfeiture and remand for reconsideration under the 
standard we articulate today.  We take this opportunity to 
provide some guidance to the district court in considering this 
issue on remand.    
 It appears from the record before us that it is 
virtually undisputed that Goodman took no steps to investigate 
whether the Rolls Royce had been used to facilitate drug 
  
trafficking at the time he acquired it.  The principal issue on 
remand, therefore, reduces to the following factual inquiry:  
whether Goodman had actual knowledge of a high probability that 
the Rolls Royce was used in drug trafficking. 
 Although the standard we announce requires proof of 
actual knowledge of the high probability, such knowledge is 
commonly proven by inference from circumstantial evidence.  Thus, 
for example, if it is proven that Goodman knew that Scarfo's only 
income was through drug trafficking, and the court finds that 
such facts are sufficient to support a conclusion that there was 
a high probability that the Rolls Royce had been used to 
facilitate drug trafficking, the district court could reasonably 
infer that Goodman actually knew about the high probability.  The 
court may also reject testimony to the contrary that it finds is 
incredible, such as Goodman's claim that he did not know about 
the high probability that the car facilitated a drug transaction 
because Scarfo and the LCN had a rule against drug dealing. 
 One question that has arisen on this appeal is whether 
the "high probability" prong of the willful blindness test 
requires knowledge of a high probability that the vehicle itself 
was used to facilitate drug transactions, or whether it refers to 
knowledge of a high probability that the former owner of the 
vehicle was accused of drug trafficking.  So stated, the answer 
is simple.  Because this forfeiture action focuses on the taint 
of the res itself, the relevant question is whether Goodman knew 
of the high probability that the Rolls Royce itself was used to 
traffic drugs.  The more difficult question, however, is whether 
  
knowledge that the previous owner had been accused of drug 
trafficking is sufficient, standing alone, to support an 
inference that the transferee was aware of a high probability 
that the car itself was used to facilitate drug trafficking.  We 
do not think so.   
 Standing alone, an accusation of drug trafficking, even 
if in the form of an indictment, does not create a sufficiently 
high probability that property of the accused was used to 
facilitate drug trafficking.  In our view, it is unreasonable to 
conclude that a claimant's knowledge of such an accusation, 
without more, supports the inference that the claimant was aware 
of a high probability that all of the property of the accused is 
tainted.  The accused may have sources of income from legitimate 
businesses, and, in the context of this case, even if Goodman 
believed that Scarfo had no legitimate sources of income, he may 
have believed that his income came from illegal activities that 
had little or nothing to do with drug trafficking, or that Scarfo 
might have owned other cars other than the Rolls Royce that he 
used in drug trafficking.16  We doubt that the civil forfeiture 
provisions, which are aimed at combating drug trafficking, are 
meant to allow forfeiture of property used in or bought from non-
drug related illegal activity. 
                     
16
.  For example, Scarfo may have received a good deal of his 
income from loan-sharking, extortion, or illegal gambling 
operations.  Thus Goodman may have thought that the probability 
was quite low that the Rolls Royce was purchased with proceeds 
from the drug trafficking of which Scarfo was accused or that 
Scarfo had used the Rolls Royce in drug transactions. 
  
 We do not mean to suggest that Goodman has shown that 
he was not willfully blind.  We state only that his knowledge 
that Scarfo had been indicted for drug dealing did not, by 
itself, necessarily invest Goodman with knowledge of a high 
probability that the car was tainted.  However, there appears to 
be some evidence that Goodman knew more about the Rolls Royce's 
particular involvement in illegal activity than simply that its 
owner had been accused of drug trafficking.  Specifically, 
shortly after he received ownership of the Rolls Royce, Goodman 
spent $4,000 removing counter-surveillance equipment from it.  In 
any event, we leave the question to the district court on 
remand.17 
                     
17
.  Another vexing aspect of the problem bears mention.  Goodman 
was not just any old acquirer of the Rolls Royce -- he was a 
lawyer.  And although the Rolls Royce was not transferred to him 
as a fee for legal services, but as repayment of a debt, we can 
scarcely write on so important and sensitive a subject without 
recognizing that the car could very easily have been a fee.  We 
therefore believe that we should at least touch upon the question 
whether our decision on this question creates an unwarranted 
strain on the attorney/client relationship.   
 It might be argued that the rule we fashion today, when 
applied in the context of an attorney's fee, creates an incentive 
on the part of the attorney to avoid investigating the client's 
case for fear that he or she might discover something that would 
negate an innocent owner defense and subject the fee to 
forfeiture.  Obviously a rule that creates such an incentive 
potentially compromises an accused's Sixth Amendment right to 
have a lawyer who thoroughly investigates his or her case. 
 But such an argument assumes that an attorney would 
lose the benefit of the innocent owner defense in a forfeiture 
proceeding against a fee if he or she discovered the taint after 
receiving the fee.  We do not think such an assumption to be 
sound.  Although at least one case suggests that a fee might be 
subject to forfeiture even when discovery of the taint occurs 
after the transfer, see 1977 Porsche Carrera 911, 748 F. Supp. at 
1188 (stating that even when a lawyer who is unaware of the taint 
at the precise moment of acquisition, it is forfeitable if he or 
she learns of the taint soon afterwards), 92 Buena Vista Avenue 
  
 
 In sum, we hold that, to avoid the "willful blindness" 
prong of the innocent owner defense in § 881(a)(4)(C), Goodman 
must demonstrate that he was not subjectively aware of a high 
probability that the Rolls Royce either was or was going to be 
used to facilitate an illegal drug transaction, or, if he was, 
that he took reasonable affirmative steps under the circumstances 
to determine whether in fact the vehicle was going to be or had 
been so used.  We also conclude that in applying this standard, 
(..continued) 
suggests the contrary.  See 113 S. Ct. at 1145 (Kennedy, J., 
dissenting) ("another oddity now given to us by the plurality 
decision is that a gratuitous transferee must forfeit the 
proceeds of a drug deal if she knew of the drug deal before she 
received the proceeds, but not if she discovered it a moment 
after.") (emphasis supplied).  And, as we discuss in the next 
subsection, fees may not be subject to forfeiture even if the 
attorney had known of the taint at the time the fee was received, 
as long as he or she did not know about the act creating the 
taint at the time it was committed.  If an attorney would not 
lose the fee when he or she only discovers the taint after 
receiving the property, then the rule we fashion would create no 
disincentive for an attorney to investigate a client's case.  It 
would merely create an incentive for an attorney to require 
payment of the fee (or retainer) up-front. 
 On the other hand, if an indictment or other serious 
accusation is enough, by itself, to create knowledge of a high 
probability of the taint that would trigger a duty to investigate 
the source of a fee, attorneys would be reluctant to take on any 
clients accused of drug trafficking.  Generally speaking, should 
an innocent ownership claim be defeatable simply because the 
property was owned by one accused of drug trafficking, a lawyer 
would hesitate to ever accept a fee in a drug case, a money 
laundering case, a structuring case, see 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(2), 
or a RICO case, see 18 U.S.C. § 1963(c).  There is, of course, no 
Sixth Amendment right to the attorney of one's choosing, see 
Caplin & Drysdale v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 624-25, 109 S. 
Ct. 2646, 2652 (1989), but we do doubt that the statute was meant 
to induce such a result.  At all events, this difficult and 
vexatious problem needs much further consideration.   
  
the mere fact that Goodman was aware that Scarfo had been accused 
of drug trafficking does not, by itself, show that Goodman was 
aware of a high probability that the property was tainted.  We 
now consider whether Goodman should also be entitled to innocent 
owner defense if he shows that he did not consent to the Rolls 
Royce's improper use.       
 
 
 C.  Is Lack of Consent An Independent 
  Defense Under § 881(a)(4)?   
 
  1.  Analysis 
 
 Should the district court conclude on remand that 
Goodman was willfully blind, the question will arise whether such 
a conclusion will defeat his claim of innocent owner status.  As 
has been mentioned, the district court believed that it did, and 
rejected Goodman's argument that, under 6109 Grubb Road, he 
should still be entitled to innocent owner protection if he could 
show that he did not consent to the use of the Rolls Royce to 
facilitate a drug transaction.  See 817 F. Supp. at 580.  As we 
have also noted above, 6109 Grubb Road held that, in the context 
of a § 881(a)(7) forfeiture, an owner who had knowledge of the 
taint will still be considered an innocent owner upon a showing 
that he or she did not consent to the use which caused the taint.  
The district court refused to apply 6109 Grubb Road, stating that 
the case did not govern § 881(a)(4)(C) forfeitures.   
 In 6109 Grubb Road, the claimant admitted knowing that 
her property had been used for drug dealing.  She argued, 
however, that notwithstanding such knowledge, she should still be 
  
entitled to innocent owner status because she could show that she 
did not consent to its use therefor.  Relying principally on the 
canon of construction that words separated by an "or" must be 
given independent meaning, the panel agreed, concluding that the 
lack of either knowledge or consent established innocent owner 
status.  886 F.2d at 626. 
 We believe that the 6109 Grubb Road analysis is 
applicable to § 881(a)(4)(C) for two reasons.  First, for all 
practical purposes, although the willful blindness language 
appears only in § 881(a)(4), the tests for innocent ownership 
under all three provisions are virtually identical, and hence the 
construction should be consistent.  See supra at 31.  Since the 
choice between reading the conditions for innocent owner status 
in the disjunctive or conjunctive will have a dramatic effect on 
the nature of the defenses, the construction should remain 
consistent across all three subsections in order to keep the 
defenses "virtually identical," see supra at 31.   
 Second, and more importantly, the central logic of the 
6109 Grubb Road decision mandates the same result in the context 
of § 881(a)(4).  As has been mentioned, the 6109 Grubb Road panel 
ultimately based its decision on the language and structure of 
the statute, in particular, the use of the traditionally 
disjunctive word "or."  886 F.2d at 626 ("The use of or in the 
statute (knowledge or consent) means that each word must be given 
its independent and ordinary meaning. . . .  Reading `knowledge 
or consent' as the canons of construction require, we conclude 
that [the claimant] can show innocent ownership by proving by a 
  
preponderance of the evidence that the illegal use of the 
property occurred either without her knowledge or without her 
consent.").  Although § 881(a)(4)(C) adds the willful blindness 
notion, the language and structure of the provision is identical 
to that of § 881(a)(7), including the use of the traditional 
disjunctive "or."  The government asks us to overlook the obvious 
similarities between §§ 881(a)(4)(C) and (7) for purposes of 
applying 6109 Grubb Road, contending that, to transpose 6109 
Grubb Road to § 881(a)(4)(C) would lead to the absurd result that 
every owner could establish the innocent owner defense.   
 The government's argument goes as follows.  First, the 
government recognizes that if 6109 Grubb Road is extended to § 
881(a)(4)(C), an owner can prevail on the innocent owner defense 
by showing either a lack of willful blindness or a lack of 
knowledge.  Second, the government assumes that willful blindness 
and knowledge are mutually exclusive.  In other words, the 
government maintains that if the court finds that the owner knew 
that the conveyance was used to facilitate drug transactions, it 
must logically conclude that the owner was not willfully blind 
thereto; concomitantly, the government contends that if the court 
finds that the owner was willfully blind to the conveyance having 
been used to facilitate drug transactions, it must necessarily 
conclude that the owner lacked knowledge thereof.  Accordingly, 
the government maintains, an owner can always show that he or she 
either lacked knowledge or was not willfully blind, causing the 
6109 Grubb Road construction to create the absurd situation in 
which an owner could successfully make out the innocent owner 
  
defense simply by failing to satisfy one of the conditions for 
innocent owner status.  Under this analysis, it argues, 6109 
Grubb Road cannot apply. 
 But in the world of logic, a syllogism is valid only if 
its premises are sound, and it appears to us that one of the 
government's premises is false.  As our discussion of willful 
blindness in the previous section demonstrates, willful blindness 
and knowledge are not mutually exclusive states of mind.  Willful 
blindness, as it is used in § 881(a)(4)(C), and as it has been 
used traditionally, is an alternative way of proving knowledge.  
In terms, "knowledge" comprises both actual knowledge -- a 
subjective belief that something is true -- and willful blindness 
-- a subjective belief that it is highly probably that something 
is true.  In other words, willful blindness is a subset of 
knowledge.  For this reason, proof of willful blindness has been 
sufficient to prove knowledge in the context of §§ 881(a)(6) and 
(7).  Since such proof establishes knowledge in the context of 
those sections, it also be suffices to establish knowledge in the 
context of § 881(a)(4)(C), for we see no reason to construe the 
term "knowledge" in § 881(a)(4)(C) differently from §§ 881(a)(6) 
and (7).  It follows, then, that an owner's failure to prove a 
lack of willful blindness simultaneously amounts to a failure to 
prove lack of knowledge for purposes of the statute.  As a 
result, the illogical result the government fears if we apply 
6109 Grubb Road to § 881(a)(4)(C) is illusory. 
 The fact that § 881(a)(7) has been interpreted to 
deprive a claimant of innocent owner status where the owner was 
  
willfully blind is important for another reason.  If the 
government is correct that willful blindness and actual knowledge 
are mutually exclusive mental states, then the "illogical" result 
would also exist in the context of § 881(a)(7).  In other words, 
the government's assumption that willful blindness and knowledge 
are mutually exclusive is at odds with the well settled case law 
holding that willful blindness is sufficient to deprive a 
claimant of the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(7).  In short, 
the government's argument is really a veiled criticism of 6109 
Grubb Road, not just of its application to § 881(a)(4)(C), and 
does not provide a basis for distinguishing § 881(a)(7) from § 
881(a)(4)(C).    
 We can find no reason why the rationale of 6109 Grubb 
Road should not apply with equal force to forfeitures under § 
881(a)(4)(C).  The legislative history clearly tells us that the 
defenses under § 881(a)(7) and § 881(a)(4)(C) are the same; the 
structure of the language in § 881(a)(4)(C) is identical to that 
in § 881(a)(7), so the same canons of construction that were 
controlling 6109 Grubb Road lead to an identical result here.  
Section 881(a)(4)(C) does not embody any policy distinct from § 
881(a)(7) which would otherwise prevent the application of 6109 
Grubb Road to the construction of its language.  We therefore 
conclude that the innocent owner defense of § 881(a)(4)(C) is 
available to any owner who can prove any one of either a lack of 
knowledge, lack of consent, or lack of willful blindness.  
Accordingly Goodman should be entitled to innocent owner status 
  
if he did not consent to the use of the Rolls Royce in 
facilitating drug trafficking. 
 
  2.  The 6109 Grubb Road Problem 
 A straightforward application of 6109 Grubb Road to the 
facts of this case suggests that on remand, Goodman could show 
that he did not consent to the improper use of the Rolls Royce by 
proving that he did not own the car at the time that it was used 
to facilitate drug transactions, that he was not in a position to 
prevent such a use of the car, and that he did not know that the 
car was being used for such a purpose at the time it was so used 
or, if he knew, that he took all reasonable steps to prevent such 
use.  If Goodman did not know that the Rolls Royce was going to 
be used in the DiSalvo or Ianarella meetings, he simply could not 
have consented to such a use.  As a result, even if Goodman 
actually knew about or was willfully blind to the car's past 
improper use at the time he obtained ownership of it, he could 
not have consented to such improper use, and hence would be an 
innocent owner.  Because we do not see how a person can consent 
to a particular use of property if he or she did not know that 
the property would be so used at or before the time of the use, 
the 6109 Grubb Road approach means that a subsequent owner who 
did not know about the act creating the taint on the property at 
or before it was committed would always be an innocent owner 
under the statute -- even if he or she knew about the act 
creating the taint at the time he or she received the property.   
  
 The result we reach by applying 6109 Grubb Road raises 
the question whether that case was properly decided as an 
original matter.  We, of course, cannot avoid the holding of that 
opinion, see Third Circuit Internal Operating Procedures 9.1, but 
the result 6109 Grubb Road created here seems at first blush 
sufficiently counterintuitive that the case needs more 
explaining.  As we describe below, although the rationale given 
in 6109 Grubb Road is not free from doubt, the result is quite 
sensible as a matter of policy.  Indeed, as we also detail below, 
the puzzling result cannot be laid at the feet of the 6109 Grubb 
Road panel.  Rather, in our view, the cause is the nearly 
impenetrable language of the statute and an intervening Supreme 
Court decision, 92 Buena Vista, the importance of which the 6109 
Grubb Road panel would not have anticipated. 
 We begin by noting that the rationale provided in 6109 
Grubb Road is vulnerable.18  The argument that the existence of 
the word "or" between the words knowledge and consent requires a 
disjunctive reading of the conditions that an owner needs to 
establish to show innocent owner status, arguably overlooked the 
importance of context in determining whether the conditions 
should be treated as disjunctive or conjunctive.  Whether 
requirements in a statute are to be treated as disjunctive or 
conjunctive does not always turn on whether the word "or" is 
                     
18
.  At the time it was decided, three judges on this court 
believed that the decision was incorrect.  See United States v. 
Parcel of Real Property Known As 6109 Grubb Road, 890 F.2d 659 
(3d Cir. 1989) (sur petition for rehearing) (Greenberg, J., 
dissenting). 
  
used; rather it turns on context.  For example, if a statute 
provides that "no cars or motorcycles are allowed in the park," a 
person trying to keep a vehicle out of the park need only show 
that the vehicle is either a car or a motorcycle.  From that 
perspective the statute is disjunctive.  On the other hand, a 
person trying to bring a vehicle into the park must show both 
that it is not a car and that it is not a motorcycle.  From that 
perspective, the statute is conjunctive.  Depending on the 
relevant context, a disjunctive test can always be reformulated 
as a conjunctive one.19   
 To be fair to the 6109 Grubb Road panel, part of the 
problem in both 6109 Grubb Road and in this case stems from the 
language of the statute itself.  Filled with negatives, its 
language is nearly impenetrable.  The difficulty with the 6109 
Grubb Road linguistic interpretation is demonstrated by removing 
two of the negatives (which should not change the meaning of the 
                     
19
.  A principle used in symbolic logic called DeMorgan's Theorem 
illustrates how language phrased in the disjunctive can be 
rephrased in the conjunctive.  Under DeMorgan's Theorem the 
denial of the alternation [not A or B] is equivalent to the 
conjunction of the denials [not A and not B].  See Lalit K. 
Loomba, The Innocent Owner Defense to Real Property Forfeiture 
Under the Comprehensive Crime Control Act of 1984, 58 Fordham L. 
Rev. 473, 481 n.68 (1989); see also United States v. Certain Real 
Property & Premises Known as 890 Noyac Road, 739 F. Supp. 111, 
113-15 (E.D.N.Y. 1990) (specifically referring to DeMorgan's 
Theorem in construing § 881(a)(7)), rev'd, 945 F.2d 1252 (2d Cir. 
1991).  Section 881(a)(7) requires an owner to establish that the 
drug trafficking was committed "without his knowledge or 
consent."  Showing that something was without knowledge or 
consent is a denial of the alternation; thus according to 
DeMorgan's Theorem, the owner must show the conjunction of the 
denial, that is, that there was no knowledge and no consent. 
  
statute) and the burden of proof language (which merely indicates 
who has to satisfy the requirements of the statute without 
indicating what the party with the burden must show):  
  [] property shall be forfeited under [§ 881(a)(7)] to 
the extent of an interest of an owner, by reason of any 
act or omission . . .  committed or omitted with[] the 
knowledge or consent of the owner. 
 
Parsed with the negatives and the burden of proof language 
excised, the statute provides that an act or omission committed 
under any one of the two conditions will preclude an innocent 
owner defense.  If an act is committed with knowledge, the 
vehicle is forfeited, and if it is committed with consent, it is 
forfeited.  Thus, a conjunctive, rather than disjunctive, reading 
seems plausible.  
 Of course, one might resort to the legislative history 
to construe the language, but unfortunately the legislative 
history is unhelpful on this issue.20  The textual analysis does 
                     
20
.  The legislative histories of §§ 881(a)(4)(C), (6) and (7) do 
not clearly state whether the conditions for the innocent owner 
defense should be read in the disjunctive or conjunctive.  Both § 
881(a)(4)(C) and § 881(a)(7) have sparse legislative histories on 
this point. The legislative histories from both statutes, 
however, reference § 881(a)(6).  Where reference in the 
legislative history of §§ 881(a)(4)(C) and (7) is made to § 
881(a)(6), it is appropriate to look at the legislative history 
of § 881(a)(6) in construing those subsections.  See 6109 Grubb 
Road, 886 F.2d at 625; United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate 
at 1012 Germantown Road, 963 F.2d 1496, 1505 (11th Cir. 1992).  
However, although Congress suggested that the proper 
interpretation of the "knew or consented" language of § 881(a)(6) 
would require the owner to prove the lack of both, see Joint 
Explanatory Statement of Titles II and III to the Psychotropic 
Substances Act of 1978, 124 Cong. Rec. 17,647 (1978), reprinted 
in 1978 U.S.C.C.A.N. 9518, 9522-23 ("[T]he property would not be 
subject to forfeiture unless the owner knew or consented to the 
[illegal conduct]."), some have questioned whether this statement 
from the legislative history is entitled to much weight because 
  
not, however, leave 6109 Grubb Road insupportable.  Quite to the 
contrary, at least three different reasons justify the 6109 Grubb 
Road approach.  First, the 6109 Grubb Road construction avoids 
making the "consent" requirement surplusage.  Construing the 
statute to require the claimant to negate both knowledge and 
consent renders the "consent" language redundant.  In other 
words, if a claimant established a lack of knowledge, this would 
necessarily negate any consent to the illegal activity, because 
"in order to consent to drug activity, one must know about it."  
United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 870, 878 (2d Cir. 
1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S. Ct. 1017 (1991) 
(quoted in 1 Smith at ¶ 4.02[6][d]).  Under a conjunctive 
reading, "[t]he term consent would be totally unnecessary since 
the factfinder would never reach the issue of consent once it 
concluded that the claimant either had knowledge or lacked 
knowledge."  1 Smith at ¶ 4.02[6][d].21 
(..continued) 
other parts of the document show confusion on how the forfeiture 
statute was meant to operate.  See Loomba, 58 Fordham L. Rev. at 
484. 
 The statement apparently incorrectly intimated that the 
burden of proof as to knowledge and consent was on the 
government, something that is clearly not the case, and at least 
one commentator has concluded from this that the statement may 
have incorrectly understood other aspects of the statute as well, 
including whether the owner must prove both lack of knowledge and 
lack of consent.  See Loomba, 58 Fordham L. Rev. at 484.  It is 
not entirely clear to us that this statement does put the burden 
of proof on the government and, even if it did, why such a 
mistake means that we should ignore the language suggesting that 
the owner must prove a lack of knowledge and consent.  
Nevertheless, we agree that this legislative history is not very 
helpful.   
21
.  Of course, any reading (conjunctive or disjunctive) will 
render one of the two terms redundant.  As one term (consent) is 
  
 Second, and more importantly, the 6109 Grubb Road 
construction ameliorates some of the harsh effects of the 
forfeiture statute.  It allows an owner to keep the property when 
he or she has done everything reasonably possible to prevent its 
use in drug activity.  See, e.g., United States v. All Right 
Title & Interest in Property Known as 710 Main St., 744 F. Supp. 
510, 524-25 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding that a landlord who closed 
off portions of a building used in drug trafficking, posted signs 
discouraging drug trafficking, restricted hours of operation of 
one of the businesses, and made anonymous phone calls to the 
police to report drug activity at his property, was an innocent 
owner); United States v. Certain Real Property & Premises Known 
as 171-02 Liberty Ave., 710 F. Supp. 46, 50-53 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) 
(holding on a motion for summary judgment that a landlord who had 
purchased property in a drug infested neighborhood with the 
intention of fixing it up, and who, after admitting knowledge of 
drug related activities in his building cooperated with police to 
try to clean it up, pressed criminal trespass charges against 
some drug dealers, and allowed police to tear down fences and 
steel doors that the dealers had erected to obstruct 
(..continued) 
a subset of the other (knowledge), the alternative disjunctive 
reading of 6109 Grubb Road renders the knowledge term superfluous 
(i.e. once the claimant successfully shows a lack of consent, a 
finding of knowledge would become irrelevant).  Consequently, 
while the redundancy argument does not mandate the 6109 Grubb 
Road reading, it does show the impossible textual box that the 
statutory language creates.   
  
surveillance, had shown enough for a jury to find that he was an 
innocent owner).22 
 Third, the 6109 Grubb Road construction avoids a 
potential constitutional problem with the statute (this third 
justification is independent of but related to the second one).  
When a landlord cognizant of drug transactions occurring at his 
or her property tries to do everything he or she reasonable can 
to prevent use of the property in that way, and the drug dealing 
continues, forfeiture of the property may be unduly oppressive.  
See Calero-Toledo, 416 U.S. at 689-90, 94 S. Ct. at 2094-95.   
 Not surprisingly, 6109 Grubb Road is now on one side of 
a circuit split on the question whether the claimant can achieve 
innocent owner status by showing the lack of one of the 
conditions.  While the Second and Eleventh Circuits have followed 
6109 Grubb Road, see United States v. 141st St. Corp., 911 F.2d 
870, 877-80 (2d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1109, 111 S. 
Ct. 1017 (1991); United States v. One Single Family Residence 
Located at 15603 85th Ave. N., 933 F.2d 976, 982 (11th Cir. 1991) 
(stating that an owner with actual knowledge that the property 
was used or is being used for drug trafficking can keep the 
                     
22
.  The Second Circuit, however, has set quite a high threshold 
for owners in similar situations to show that they took 
reasonable steps to prevent the improper use.  See United States 
v. Two Parcels of Property Located at 19 and 25 Castle Street, 
New Haven, CT., 1994 WL 378646 (2d Cir. July 18, 1994) (owners 
whose children were using drugs in home and who asked their 
children to attend a rehabilitation program, sent some of the 
children away, and notified police of narcotics activity in the 
neighborhood, did not undertake every reasonable means of 
preventing the improper use and were not innocent owners).   
  
property if he can show that "everything reasonably possible was 
done" to prevent the taint),23 the Ninth Circuit has adopted the 
opposite position, see United States v. One Parcel of Land at Lot 
111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) ("[I]f the claimant 
either knew or consented to the illegal activities, the `innocent 
owner' defense is unavailable."); see also 890 Noyac Road, 739 F. 
Supp. at 113-115 (providing a good explanation of the problem 
with 6109 Grubb Road); cf. 1989 Jeep Wagoneer, 976 F.2d at 1174 
(8th Cir.) (noting the circuit split without not taking a 
position on the question).24  
                     
23
.  See 1012 Germantown Road, 963 F.2d at 1504-05 (11th Cir.) 
(interpreting § 881(a)(7)'s innocent owner defense to require 
only that the owner prove a lack of knowledge or a lack of 
consent; "an owner can avoid forfeiture by proving either 
ignorance or non-consent"); United States v. One Parcel of 
Property, Located at 755 Forest Road, 985 F.2d 70 (2d Cir. 1993) 
("The so-called `innocent owner' defense is an affirmative 
defense to be proven by the owner-claimant.  It permits an owner 
to avoid forfeiture by establishing [by a preponderance of the 
evidence] either that [s]he had no knowledge of the narcotics 
activity, or if [s]he had knowledge, that she did not consent to 
it." (internal quotations omitted)); United States v. Certain 
Real Property & Premises Located at 418 57th Street, 922 F.2d 
129, 131 (2d Cir. 1990) (reversing a grant of summary judgment 
because the "holding in 141st Street mandates consideration of 
consent as well as knowledge when adjudicating an innocent owner 
defense to drug forfeiture"); United States v. One 107.9 Acre 
Parcel of Land, 898 F.2d 396 (3d Cir. 1990) (following 6109 Grubb 
Road and denying a non-consent defense on the ground that it was 
supported by nothing other than uncorroborated and self-serving 
statements). 
24
.  Indeed subsequent statements in Congress show disagreement 
within Congress over whether 6109 Grubb Road misread the statute.  
Compare 136 Cong. Rec. 6586, 6594 (1990) (statement of Sen. Dole) 
(proposing an amendment to § 881(a)(7) to remedy the 
"incorrectness of the [6109 Grubb Road] holding") with 139 Cong. 
Rec. S15,612-13 (daily ed. November 10, 1993) (statement of Sen. 
Jeffords) (introducing a bill, S. 1655, 103rd Cong. 1st Sess. 
(1993), the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act, which changes the 
  
 The upshot of this extended analysis of 6109 Grubb Road 
is that, while reasonable people can disagree about its 
correctness, 6109 Grubb Road is defensible.  The 6109 Grubb Road 
construction of the statute sensibly works to the benefit of 
people who own property before the illegal act is committed.   
However, as we have  discussed, 6109 Grubb Road ensures that a 
post-illegal-act transferee who did not know of the illegal act 
at the time it occurred will always be able to make out the 
innocent owner defense, regardless of whether he or she knew 
about the taint at the time of the transfer. 
 The 6109 Grubb Road opinion makes no mention of this 
problem.  But that is understandable because, at the time 6109 
Grubb Road was decided, its construction would have had no effect 
at all on the rights of post-illegal-act transferees.  At that 
time it was generally assumed that because of the "relation back" 
provision of the forfeiture statute, 21 U.S.C. § 881(h), which 
vested title in the United States at the moment of the illegal 
act, a post-illegal-act transferee could never have better title 
than the United States and could never benefit from the innocent 
(..continued) 
language in § 881(a)(7) so that it clearly adopts the 6109 Grubb 
Road approach).  The Senate bill, S. 1655, is companion 
legislation to H.R. 2417, 103rd Cong. 2d Sess. (1993), introduced 
in the House by Representative Hyde.  The bills propose 
dramatically to weaken 21 U.S.C. § 881 and are designed 
specifically to reject case law requiring an owner to show a lack 
of both knowledge and consent.  139 Cong. Rec. at S15,613 (daily 
ed. November 10, 1993) (citing United States v. One Parcel of 
Land at Lot 111-B, 902 F.2d 1443, 1445 (9th Cir. 1990) (endorsing 
a conjunctive construction of the innocent owner language)). 
  
owner defense.25  In 1993, however, the Supreme Court decided 
United States v. Parcel of Land, Bldgs., Appurtenances & 
Improvements at 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Rumson, N.J., 113 S. Ct. 
1126 (1993), holding that the relation back provision does not 
defeat the rights of a post-illegal-act transferee who otherwise 
satisfies the requirements for the innocent owner defense under § 
881(a)(6).  Thus, 92 Buena Vista Avenue has the effect of making 
the "knowledge or consent" language of the statute as interpreted 
by 6109 Grubb Road applicable to post-illegal-act transferees 
and, in turn, creates the problem of insulating certain owners 
who one reasonably might not consider to be deserving. 
  
 
  3.  Dealing With The Dilemma 
 One possible solution to this problem would be to 
divide potentially innocent owners into two categories, pre-
                     
25
.  See Eggleston v. Colorado, 873 F.2d 242, 248 (10th Cir. 
1989) (holding that the innocent owner provision could not help 
such subsequent owners because they were not owners; "[t]he 
innocent owner exception applies only to owners whose interest 
vests prior to the date of the illegal act that forms the basis 
for the forfeiture"), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1070, 110 S. Ct. 
1112 (1990); In re One 1985 Nissan, 889 F.2d 1317 (4th Cir. 1989) 
(holding the same and citing Eggleston and United States v. 6109 
Grubb Road, 708 F. Supp. 698 (W.D. Pa. 1989) to support its 
conclusion); see also S. Rep. No. 225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess., 196 
(1983), reprinted in, 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3379 ("In civil 
forfeitures, such [subsequent] transfers are voidable, for the 
property is considered `tainted' from the time of its prohibited 
use or acquisition."); United States v. $41,305.00 in Currency & 
Traveler's Checks, 802 F.2d 1339, 1346 (11th Cir. 1986) 
(suggesting that subsequent bona fide purchasers could not be 
innocent owners because of § 881(h)). 
  
illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act transferees, and apply 
the 6109 Grubb Road disjunctive test to the first category but 
the conjunctive test to the second one.26  That approach is, in 
fact, what one federal district court in Florida has followed.  
See  United States v. One Parcel of Real Estate Located at 6640 
S.W. 48th St., 831 F. Supp. 1578 (S.D. Fla. 1993).  In 6640 S.W. 
48th Street, the court was confronted with essentially the same 
problem in this case (except that it was applying § 881(a)(7)).  
The court recognized that 92 Buena Vista Avenue created a problem 
in applying the innocent owner provision to post-illegal-act 
transferees in jurisdictions (including its own) following the 
6109 Grubb Road approach, since it realized that under such an 
approach, the claimant would be declared an innocent owner 
because "[he] could not possibly have consented to . . . the 
illegal activities."  Id. at 1585.  To avoid that result, the 
court declined to follow the 6109 Grubb Road approach in such a 
                     
26
.  Another possible approach would be to treat the term 
"consent" as encompassing a notion of retroactive consent.  Under 
certain circumstances, the law treats consent as operating 
retroactively.  The concept of ratification in agency law, for 
example, allows a principle to be bound by an agent's 
unauthorized prior act if he knows about it and fails to take 
affirmative steps to disavow the act.  See Restatement (Second) 
of Agency § 83 (1958).  But such a notion of retroactive consent 
is a stretch from what is ordinarily meant by the word consent.  
Indeed, perhaps because of this, even in agency law the concept 
of ratification requires a special relationship and does not 
prevent a contracting party from keeping the profits from a 
transaction induced by the fraud of a third person if he did not 
know of the fraud until after the transaction was completed.  Id. 
at cmt. c.  We therefore believe that, given the absence of any 
indication to the contrary from Congress, we should employ the 
more conventional definition of consent.            
  
context, and concluded that the consent language should be 
ignored altogether when considering a post-illegal-act 
transferee:  "Consent is simply irrelevant when examining the 
innocent owner claims of post-illegal act transferees."  Id.  
 By performing what might be termed an act of judicial 
legislation, the court closed a "loophole" in the statute and 
prevented post-illegal-act transferees with knowledge at the time 
of the transfer of the property's taint from escaping the 
forfeiture statute.  But the statute simply draws no such 
distinction between pre-illegal-act owners and post-illegal-act 
transferees.  We cannot justify reading the very same language in 
a statute disjunctively with respect to one class of owners and 
conjunctively with respect to another, in the absence of any 
instruction from Congress to do so.  The dissent contends that a 
failure to draw such a distinction would constitute judicial 
abdication, citing cases which require us "to construe a statute 
to avoid absurd results, if alternative interpretations are 
available and consistent with the legislative purpose."  United 
States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 876, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1994) (citing 
Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 458 U.S. 564 (1982)).  The 
obligation as expressed in these cases does not involve or 
support, however, reading statutory language differently in the 
absence of a justification in either the language of the statute 
or the legislative history.  In this case, there is no such 
instruction in either the statute or legislative history. 
 Given that the language of the statute as interpreted 
by 6109 Grubb Road favors Goodman in this context, we are faced 
  
with, at the very least, an ambiguity in the statutory language.  
Because § 881(a)(4) is punitive and quasi-criminal in nature, see 
Austin v. United States, 113 S. Ct. 2801, 2810-2811 (1993) 
(holding that §§ 881(a)(4) and 881(a)(7) are punitive in nature), 
we must apply the rule of lenity, which requires us to resolve 
the ambiguity in favor of the claimant, see United States v. 
Thompson/Center Arms Co., 112 S. Ct. 2102, 2110 & n.10 (1992) 
(applying the rule of lenity in construing a punitive tax statute 
in a civil setting).27  Thus, on remand, if Goodman can show that 
he did not know that the Rolls Royce was being used or going to 
be used in the DiSalvo or Ianarella meetings at the time they 
took place, then he will be able to show that he did not consent 
to the use and, under 6109 Grubb Road, will be entitled to the 
innocent owner defense. 
 We might be tempted to draw a similar distinction to 
that drawn by the court in 6640 S.W. 48th Street despite the 
absence of any guidance from Congress if the result we have 
reached here were unreasonable.  But it is not unreasonable to 
think that post-illegal-act transferees of property interests 
would not be subject to forfeiture, at least with respect to §§ 
881(a)(4) and (7) forfeitures.  The principal goal of §§ 
881(a)(4) and (7), which are aimed at forfeitures of property 
used to facilitate drug trafficking, is to give owners of 
property an incentive to prevent use of that property in the drug 
                     
27
.  See also id. at 2114 (Stevens, J. dissenting) ("The main 
function of the rule of lenity is to protect citizens from the 
unfair application of ambiguous punitive statutes."). 
  
trade.  People who are not owners at the time the act is 
committed are simply in no position to prevent the improper use.  
Penalizing such owners would do little to accomplish the ends of 
those forfeiture statutes.28 
 Moreover, at a much more fundamental level, the Court's 
decision in 92 Buena Vista Avenue creates substantial doubt that 
post-illegal-act transferees without knowledge of the illegal act 
until after it happened are within the scope of the forfeiture 
statutes.  In 92 Buena Vista Avenue, the Court discussed, in 
dicta, the question whether such owners were within the scope of 
§ 881(a)(6).  Although the plurality suggested that equitable 
principles (and not the statutory language) might prevent a post-
illegal-act transferee with knowledge of the illegal act at the 
                     
28
.  This argument is somewhat suspect if 6109 Grubb Road applies 
to § 881(a)(6), since § 881(a)(6)'s language providing for 
forfeiture of all "proceeds traceable" to drug transactions 
appears to include within its scope property in the hands of 
post-illegal-act transferees.  See 124 Cong. Rec. 23,057 (1978) 
(remarks of Sen. Nunn) (explaining the rationale for § 881(a)(6) 
was "to make it clear that a bona fide party who has no knowledge 
or consent to the property he owns having been derived from an 
illegal transaction [would not have the property forfeited]"); 
id. at 23,056 (remarks of Sen. Culver) (describing the provision 
as reaching property traceable to illegal proceeds); id. at 
34,667 (remarks of Sen. Culver) ("This amendment would authorize 
Federal officers to seize such moneys much as they now seize 
illicit drugs and vehicles that are used to transport or conceal 
these substances.  In certain cases they would also be able to 
seize property that is traceable to such illegal transactions."); 
see also S. Rep. No. 98-225, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 195-96, 
reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3182, 3378-79 (describing that 
part of the forfeiture scheme is to reach property that has been 
transferred by one involved in drug trafficking to avoid 
forfeiture).  Perhaps because § 881(a)(6) appears to reach post-
illegal-act transferees, we have been unable to find a court of 
appeals decision that squarely applied the 6109 Grubb Road 
analysis in the context of § 881(a)(6) forfeiture. 
  
time of the transfer from having the benefit of the innocent 
owner defense, it ultimately avoided the issue by stating that 
"respondent has assumed the burden of convincing the trier of 
fact that she had no knowledge of the alleged source of [the 
property]."  113 S. Ct. at 1137.  In a concurring opinion, 
however, Justice Scalia stated that it would not be absurd to 
think that the forfeiture statutes did not reach post-illegal-act 
transferees who knew about the act creating the taint at the time 
of transfer, but not at the time it occurred: 
 I do not find inconceivable the possibility 
that post-illegal-act transferees with post-
illegal-act knowledge of the earlier 
illegality are provided a defense against 
forfeiture.  The Government would still be 
entitled to the property held by the drug 
dealer and by close friends and relatives who 
are unable to meet their burden of proof as 
to ignorance of the illegal act when it 
occurred. 
 
92 Buena Vista Avenue, 113 S. Ct. at 1142 (Scalia, J., 
concurring).  If Justice Scalia is right, allowing post-illegal-
act transferees with post-illegal-act knowledge to be outside the 
scope of the forfeiture statute is defensible, and thus a 
straightforward application of 6109 Grubb Road to post-illegal-
act transferees would not create an absurd result.29    
                     
29
.  It is important to note that the discussion in 92 Buena 
Vista was focused on defining "knowledge" under the innocent 
owner defense, i.e., on whether "knowledge" meant pre-illegal-act 
knowledge.  Thus 92 Buena Vista suggests that a post-illegal-act 
transferee with post-illegal-act knowledge would be beyond the 
reach of the forfeiture statutes for reasons wholly independent 
of the 6109 Grubb Road construction of the statute.  We do not 
suggest that 92 Buena Vista directly validates the 6109 Grubb 
Road construction.  Rather, we refer to 92 Buena Vista in this 
  
 In his dissent in 92 Buena Vista Avenue, Justice 
Kennedy complained that "the plurality's opinion leaves the 
forfeiture scheme that is the centerpiece of the Nation's drug 
enforcement laws in quite a mess."  In the context of the present 
case, Justice Kennedy was only partially right.  It is not so 
much the plurality's opinion in 92 Buena Vista Avenue that leaves 
the civil forfeiture laws in chaos, nor for that matter is it 
this court's interpretation of the statute in 6109 Grubb Road.  
In our estimation, the problem originated in Congress when it 
failed to draft a statute that takes into account the substantial 
differences between those owners who own the property during the 
improper use and some of those who acquire it afterwards.  
Although a schizophrenic reading of the text might solve the 
problem, the better solution, we believe, is to apply 6109 Grubb 
Road.  Congress should redraft the statute, if it desires a 
different result.  The judgment of the district court will be 
vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings consistent 
with this opinion. 
(..continued) 
context to show that the result that 6109 Grubb Road invites is 
not unreasonable. 
United States v. One 1973 Rolls Royce, No. 93-1417         
 
NYGAARD, Circuit Judge, dissenting:  
 
   I disagree with my colleagues that we should be 
controlled in how we interpret § 881(a)(4)(C) by United States v. 
6109 Grubb Road, 886 F.2d 618, 623-626 (3d Cir. 1989) and the 
conclusion they reach; that a purchaser of property, forfeitable 
in the seller's hands, need only show either a lack of knowledge 
or a lack of consent to raise an "innocent owner" defense under § 
881(a)(7), and thereby shield the property from forfeiture.   
 Indeed, the majority's holding completely nullifies the 
"willful blindness" provision of that section, because a 
purchaser who is ignorant of a property's illicit use, whether 
willfully or innocently, can logically neither grant nor deny 
consent to how his predecessor used it.  Moreover, one can 
neither deny nor give consent to the use of property unless one 
has either ownership or control, or for that matter, some legally 
cognizable interest in it.  Hence, applying Grubb to willfully 
blind, post-illegal act transferees will create a virtual 
windfall for them, because they cannot lose.  Following the 
majority's conclusion, one such as Goodman may purchase a 
mobster's car, knowing it to have been used to facilitate drug 
trafficking, with full confidence that it is shielded from 
forfeiture because he did not give the mobster his consent to use 
the property illicitly.   
  
 The majority reaches its conclusion because it is 
unable to reconcile the district court's holding with Grubb, 
involving § 881 (a)(7) and United States v. 92 Buena Vista., 113 
S.Ct. 1126 (1993), which interpreted § 881 (a) (6) and (h). In 
reversing the district court, which held that  Grubb does not 
apply to forfeitures under § 881(a)(4)(C), the majority concludes 
that under Grubb Goodman could invoke the innocent owner defense 
if he did not consent to his predecessor-in-title's use of the 
Rolls Royce to facilitate illegal drug transactions; this despite 
willfully blinding himself to that very fact.  
 I simply do not believe that Grubb even applies to 
post-illegal-act property purchasers who are aware of or 
willfully blind to their property's past use in facilitating 
illegal drug transactions.   Neither Grubb nor Buena Vista 
applies to post-illegal-act transferees and neither interprets § 
881 (a)(4)(c).  The "willful blindness" language unique to §§ 
(a)(4)(C) requires us to interpret the innocent owner defense of 
that section differently from subsections that do not contain the 
willful blindness language; for example §§ (a)(6)&(7).  I would 
disallow knowing or willfully blind purchasers of otherwise 
forfeitable property from invoking the innocent owner defense, 
and not expansively apply Grubb to these facts when it clearly is 
not warranted.   
 I also reject the majority's resignation that only 
Congress can cure this difficulty.  This, I fear, is more an act 
  
of judicial abdication than judicial restraint.  I believe we are 
obligated to make sense of the statute and avoid a result that 
contradicts its purpose.  It may be true, as my colleagues 
suggest, that the problem should be remedied by Congress.  I 
suggest, however, that we cannot hide so easily.  We are 
obligated to construe the statute to avoid absurd results if 
alternative interpretations are available, plausible and 
consistent with its purpose.  United States v. Schneider, 14 F.3d 
876, 879-80 (3d Cir. 1994)(citing Griffin v. Oceanic Contractors, 
Inc., 458 U.S. 564 (1982)).     
     In sum, according to my colleagues' 
"straightforward" conclusion, condensed at page 8 of their 
Opinion (Maj. typsc. p. 8) , in Goodman's case he need only show 
that he did not consent to the Rolls Royce's illicit use, and is 
then entitled to innocent owner status.  I believe, however, 
their analysis contravenes both logic and Congress' very purpose 
in promulgating § 881, that is, to curb illegal drug activity.  I 
must respectfully dissent.    
                                I. 
 First, however, I conclude that the district 
court applied the correct standard in 
assessing whether Goodman was willfully blind 
within the meaning of § 881(a)(4)(C).  The 
test employed by the district court was not a 
negligent or an objective due care standard, 
  
nor was it inconsistent with our precedent 
defining willful blindness.  With no case of 
this court directly on point, the district 
court developed its own standard:    
 Lack of willful blindness sufficient to 
prevail as an innocent owner under  
 § 881(a)(4)C) means that a claimant must show 
that he or she has not ignored a signal or 
suggestion that a vehicle might have been 
used to facilitate the trafficking of illegal 
drugs . . . . [O]nce the claimant chooses to 
ignore the signal, he or she can no longer 
establish lack of willful blindness to the 
prior use of the vehicle that would subject 
it to forfeiture.   
 
 I would conclude that the district court's standard for 
establishing willful blindness is consistent with United States 
v. Caminos, 770 F.2d 361, 365 (3d Cir. 1985), in which we said 
that a "deliberate ignorance" jury charge "[m]ust make clear that 
the defendant himself was subjectively aware of the high 
probability of fact in question, and not merely that a reasonable 
man would have been aware of the probability."     
 Ultimately, the district court made a subjective 
inquiry into Goodman's state of mind when it found that he 
ignored rather obvious signals or suggestions that the Rolls 
Royce was legally infected and subject to forfeiture when he 
acquired it.  As the district court found, Goodman knew of 
Scarfo's illegal activities.  Moreover, that he had 
countersurveillance equipment removed from the vehicle further 
suggests that he was continually aware that it was legally 
  
tainted after the transfer.  On this basis, the trial judge made 
a clear credibility determination against Goodman's claim, "that 
he had absolutely no indication [that] the Rolls Royce was ever 
utilized to facilitate drug trafficking", and found his testimony 
to be incredible.  I conclude the district court employed a 
subjective standard and found that Goodman was willfully blind, 
to which we must defer in the absence of clear error.  I would 
affirm both the district court standard and its subjective 
assessment that Goodman was willfully blind.      
 
    II.  
 Second, Grubb held, in the context of § 881(a)(7), 
another drug forfeiture subsection, that an owner who knows a 
vehicle is legally contaminated will still be considered an 
innocent owner upon showing that he or she did not consent to its 
drug-trafficking use.  From similarities between § 881(a)(4)(C) 
and other drug forfeiture subsections, particularly §§ 881(a)(6) 
and (a)(7), and because we  rendered a disjunctive reading of § 
881(a)(7) in 6109 Grubb Road, the majority concludes that § 
881(a)(4)(C) should also be read disjunctively.  
 Section 881(a)(4)(C), however, contains the willful 
blindness language found in neither §§ 881(a)(6) nor (a)(7), 
civil forfeiture subsections which only provide for an innocent 
owner defense when there is a lack of knowledge or a lack of 
consent.  Moreover, the legislative history establishes that § 
  
881(a)(4)(C)'s willful blindness language is not mere surplusage 
and should not be treated as such.        
 If we apply Grubb to forfeitures under § 881(a)(4)(C) 
involving willfully blind, post-illegal act transferees, we 
wholly disregard § 881(a)(4)(C)'s willful blindness language and 
Congress' intent to prevent willfully blind owners from invoking 
the innocent owner defense.  If a claimant fails to prove lack of 
willful blindness, but can alternatively prevail by satisfying 
the sure-winner defense for a non-owner -- lack of consent -- 
then the willful blindness language becomes utterly nullified.  
 
     A disjunctive reading of § 881(a)(4)(C)'s "knowledge, 
consent or willful blindness" brings the language into direct 
conflict with itself, thus producing an absurd result with 
respect to willfully blind subsequent owners.  Nevertheless, the 
majority applying Grubb, holds that Goodman should be allowed to 
prove his innocent ownership based on lack of consent.  Since 
consent involves an owner's acquiescence to the property's use in 
drug trafficking, Goodman, as a subsequent owner or transferee, 
will always be able to show a lack of consent if he had no legal 
interest in or control of the Rolls Royce when it was used to 
facilitate the drug transaction.   
 As a result, any finding that Goodman was willfully 
blind to the vehicle's taint when he received it is useless, 
because if "blind," whether willfully or ignorantly, he did not 
  
know and could not give or deny his consent, even if somehow 
authorized or empowered to do so.  In other words, willful 
blindness conceptually presupposes the absence of knowledge and 
consent.  When an owner fails to prove that his lack of knowledge 
is not the result of willful blindness, the less stringent 
standards for proving lack of knowledge and lack of consent are 
then irrelevant.  
 The premise of Grubb is that the language of § 
881(a)(7), (no property shall be forfeited "by any reason of any 
act or omission established by that owner to have been committed 
or omitted without the knowledge or consent of that owner") 
should be read disjunctively because of Congress' use of the 
traditionally disjunctive word "or."  According to Grubb's 
analysis of § 881(a)(7), Congress' use of the word "or" implies 
that each provision to which it refers should be given 
independent weight.  Yet, by a disjunctive reading of § 881 
(a)(4)(C), a subsequent owner who avoids investigating an obvious 
possibility that his or her property is forfeitable in the hands 
of the transferor, will always be able to establish innocent 
owner status because of his or her lack of consent.  In sum, a 
disjunctive interpretation of § 881(a)(4)(C) is tantamount to 
ignoring the willful blindness language of that subsection.  I do 
not read it that way.   
 The district court also remedied this problem by 
refusing to apply Grubb to cases involving willfully blind, post-
  
illegal act transferees.  The district court differentiates 
between owners who use their property to facilitate drug 
trafficking, where application of Grubb would make sense; and 
willfully blind post-illegal-act transferees, where its 
application would not.  I would too.  The import of this 
differentiation is that we should not blindly read the "or" in § 
881(a)(4)(C) disjunctively, but rather, should examine the 
context in which "or" is used, because in some circumstances "or" 
does not apply or should be read as "and".  Reiter v. Sonotone 
Corp., 442 U.S. 330, 339 (1979)(terms connected by a disjunctive 
word must be given their separate meanings unless the context 
dictates otherwise); see also United States v. Smeathers, 884 
F.2d 363-64, (8th Cir. 1989)(citing United States v. Moore, 613 
F.2d 1029, 1040 (D.C.Cir. 1979))(the word "or" connotes 
disjunction except when a disjunctive reading would frustrate 
legislative intent).    
 Finally, Buena Vista does not create doubt that post-
illegal act transferees, aware of a property's taint at the time 
of its conveyance or thereafter, should benefit from the 
forfeiture statutes' innocent owner defenses.  Section 881 
codifies the common law relation back doctrine, as defined by the 
Supreme Court in United States v. Stowell, 10 S.Ct. 244, 247 
(1889), which prevents the possibility of a post-illegal act 
transferee invoking the innocent owner defense, because title to 
  
a defendant's property vests in the government at the time the 
drug crime occurs.        
 In Buena Vista, the Supreme Court purposely did not 
address whether post-illegal act transferees could invoke the 
innocent owner defense because in that case the "respondent . . . 
assumed the burde 
n of convincing the trier of fact that she had no knowledge of 
the alleged source of [the property]."  Buena Vista, 113 S.Ct. at 
1137.  Hence, consideration of whether post-illegal act 
transferees, aware of a property's taint only at the time of 
conveyance or thereafter, was not central to the Court's 
analysis.  The Court did, however, address the issue in dictum, 
but then leaned away from the majority position here.  It stated 
that equitable doctrines may foreclose the assertion of the 
innocent owner defense by a post-illegal act transferee "with 
guilty knowledge of the tainted character of a property."  Id. 
 In sum, given the legislative history of § 881 
(a)(4)(C)'s willful blindness language and Buena Vista's 
instructional dictum about foreclosing the innocent owner defense  
for willfully blind subsequent owners and transferees, the 
district court did not err by concluding that Grubb does not 
apply to purchasers of forfeitable property.  Section 
881(a)(4)(C)'s "knowledge, consent or willful blindness" language 
requires a conjunctive reading to prevent conflict among the 
provisions, because consent to the vehicle's use in drug activity 
  
is irrelevant if one is a willfully blind post-illegal act 
transferee.  Then too, given the district court's finding of 
willful blindness alone, Goodman was precluded from making an 
innocent owner defense under that subsection's other provisions.  
I conclude that the subject vehicle was properly forfeited and 
so, dissent.    
         
